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CIVIL PROCEDURE-IN FORMA PAUPERIS EMPLOYMENT DIS
CRIMINATION PLAINTIFFS AND THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT: Es
CAPING THE IS(c) TRAP
INTRODUCTION

An individual alleging employment discrimination against the
federal government is faced with an extremely short limitations period
when attempting to obtain relief by filing a civil action.} Title VII of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964 establishes a thirty-day time limit in
which an action must be filed and requires that the proper defendant
in such a suit be the "head ~f the department, agency, or unit, as ap
propriate."2 The short limitations period, combined with the necessity
for specificity in naming the appropriate defendant, presents particular
peril to the person who is proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis. 3 A
pro se plaintiff is often not aware that the head of the agency must be
the named defendant and errs by naming the agency or department
itself.4 Once the plaintiff learns of the error, he or she will attempt to
amend the complaint to correct the name of the defendant in an effort
to continue the suit. S If the amendment is attempted after the expira
tion of the thirty-day limitations period, courts are required to apply
the relation back provisions of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure IS(c).6
The amendment will be allowed to relate back to the original filing
date if it meets the four-pronged test developed by the United States
Supreme Court in Schiavone v. Fortune. 7 The "linchpin" of relation
back is notice. 8 Notice of the suit must have been received before the
1. See Title VII of The Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-I6(c) (1988).
2. Title VII ofthe Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, §§ 701-716, 78 Stat.
241, 253-66 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (1988».
3. See. e.g., Johnson v. United States Postal Serv., 861 F.2d 1475 (10th Cir. 1988),
cert. denied, lIO S. Ct. 54 (1989).
4. See. e.g., Warren v. Department of Army, 867 F.2d lI56, lI57-58 (8th Cir. 1989);
Johnson, 861 F.2d at 1476; Paulk v. Department of Air Force, 830 F.2d 79, 80 (7th Cir.
1987).
5. Warren, 867 F.2d 1156; Johnson, 861 F.2d 1475; Paulk, 830 F.2d 79.
6. See Schiavone v. Fortune, 477 U.S. 21, 22 (1986). For the text of Rule 15(c), see
infra note 48.
7. 477 U.S. 21 (1986). For the text of the four-prong test, see infra text accompany
ing note 67.
8. Schiavone, 477 U.S. at 31.
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limitations period has expired. 9
Since the Schiavone decision, the United States courts of appeals
have developed differing approaches regarding the application of Rule
lS(c) to amended complaints filed by employment discrimination
plaintiffs proceeding in forma pauperis against the federal govern
ment. lO A principal issue in these cases has been whether the statutory
limitations period will be tolled or held in abeyance when the plaintiff
attempts to correct the name of the defendant after the expiration of
the period. 11 The doctrine of tolling is a judicially-created exception
to statutory limitations periods based upon equity. The use of equita
ble tolling often conflicts with the purpose of statutes of limitations,
which are designed to protect defendants from stale claims even
though these claims may be just.12 Accordingly, the judiciary is hesi
tant to toll a statutory limitations period and substitute its view for
that of the legislature. Nonetheless, due to a wide degree of judicial
discretion, the courts still use tolling where "the interests of justice
require vindication of the plaintiff's rights."13
Application of equitable tolling in this area is further complicated
by the provisions of the federal in forma pauperis statute which re
quires that the district court and the United States Marshal's Service
effect all service. 14 This requirement forces the plaintiff to rely on the
court to properly and promptly complete service.
This Comment will discuss the interaction between Title VII,ls
the in forma pauperis statute,16 the relation back provisions of Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure lS(c),17 and the doctrine of equitable tolling.
This Comment will address how this interaction may result in a litiga
tion "trap"18 for the Title VII, in forma pauperis plaintiff proceeding
9. Id. (citing 6 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE
§ 1489, at 250 (Supp. 1986».
10. Soto v. United States Postal Serv., 905 F.2d 537 (1st Cir. 1990), cert. denied, III
.S. Ct. 679 (1991); Warren v. Department of Army, 867 F.2d 1156 (8th Cir. 1989); Johnson
v. United States Postal Serv., 861 F.2d 1475 (10th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 54
(1989); Mondy v. Secretary of Army, 845 F.2d 1051 (D.C. Cir. 1988); Paulk v. Department
of Air Force, 830 F.2d 79 (7th Cir. 1987).
11. See cases cited supra note 10.
12. Order of R.R. Telegraphers v. Railway Express Agency, Inc., 321 U.S. 342, 348
49 (1944).
13. Burnett v. New York Cent. R.R., 380 U.S. 424, 428 (1965).
14. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(c) (1988).
15. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-5 to -16 (1988).
16. 28 U.S.C. § 1915 (1988).
17. FED. R. CIV. P. 15(c).
18. See Gonzales v. Secretary of Air Force, 824 F.2d 392, 396 (5th Cir. 1987)
(Brown, J., dissenting) ("The majority's characterization of § 2000e-16(c) and Rule 15(c)
as traps to frustrate a citizen in his quest to vindicate his civil right is contrary to the spirit
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against the federal government. As background, Section I of this
Comment will outline the applicable requirements of Title VII and the
in forma pauperis statute. Section I will also discuss the decision in
Schiavone v. Fortune,19 and the standards for relation back under Rule
15(c).
Section II presents decisions of the United States courts of ap
peals regarding equitable tolling as it relates to the Title VII, in forma
pauperis plaintiff. Section III discusses the general concept of the doc
trine of equitable tolling and presents an outline for application of the
doctrine. Section III then reviews the decisions of the courts of ap
peals in light of this analytic framework.
Section IV critiques the use of equitable tolling as a means of al
lowing relation back of amended pleadings in Title VII cases. Section
IV then proposes options which would lessen the need of a Title VII,
in forma pauperis plaintiff to resort to the doctrine of equitable tolling
as a means of escaping the Rule 15(c) trap.
I.

A.

BACKGROUND

Title VII Procedural Requirements for Civil Suit

Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibits employment
discrimination by the federal government on the basis of race, color,
religion, sex or national origin.20 To pursue a discrimination claim, an
aggrieved individual must first pursue available administrative reme
dies. 21 If such remedies prove unsuccessful, an individual may bring a
of our civil rights laws and the aspirations of the drafters of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure."), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 969 (1988); 6A C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & M. KANE,
FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1502, at 167 (1990) (''The 1966 amendment [to
Rule 15(c)] should have the desirable effect of facilitating a citizen's suit against his sover
eign by eliminating an unnecessary trap for the unwary.").
19. 477 U.S. 21 (1986).
20. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 § 717(a) (codified as amended at 42
U.S.C. § 2000e-16(a) (1988». The federal government includes the United States Postal
Service. Id. The Rehabilitation Act of 1973 similarly prohibits discrimination based on
physical handicap. The Rehabilitation Act of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-112, § 501, 87 Stat.
355, 390 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 791 (1988».
21. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16(c) (1988). The Equal Employment Opportunity Commis
sion ("EEOC") is charged by Congress with the general administration of Title VII. Id.
§ 2000e-4, -5. Regulations promulgated by the EEOC require federal employees alleging
prohibited employment discrimination to first pursue processing of their complaint through
the internal procedures of their own agency or department. 29 C.F.R. § 1613.214 (1990).
After final disposition by the agency, the employee may pursue the claim to the EEOC or
to federal court. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16(c) (1988). For a general discussion of administra
tive remedies under Title VII, see L. MODJESKA, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW
§ 2.7, at 216-26 (2d ed. 1988).
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civil action against the offending federal agency or department within
thirty days after receipt of a notice of final administrative action. 22
Receipt of this notice, known as a right-to-sue letter,23 begins the
thirty-day period for filing suit. 24
If an individual decides to sue, he or she must commence the ac
tion by filing a complaint with the appropriate federal district court. 25
To satisfy the statute of limitations period, the complaint must be filed
with the court before the expiration of the thirty-day period. 26 For
any subsequent amended pleadings to relate back to the date of the
original filing, the service of process must issue and be received by the
proper defendant within the thirty days after the plaintiff received his
right-to-sue letter. 27 Generally, courts have read literally the require
ment for naming the proper defendant, thus making it imperative that
the plaintiff name the appropriate party.28 However, it is not uncom
mon for the pro se plaintiff to name the wrong defendant. During the
pursuit of Title VII administrative remedies, it is usually the agency
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-I6(c) (1988). The statute states:
Within thirty days of receipt of notice of final action taken by a department,
agency, or unit ... or by the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission upon
an appeal from a decision or order of such department, agency, or unit on a
complaint of discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex or national ori
gin, ... or after one hundred and eighty days from the filing of the initial charge
with the department, agency, or unit or with the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission on appeal from a decision or order of such department, agency, or
unit until such time as final action may be taken by a department, agency, or unit,
an employee or applicant for employment, if aggrieved by the final disposition of
his complaint, or by the failure to take final action on his complaint, may file a
civil action as provided in section 2000e-5 of this title, in which civil action the
head of the department, agency, or unit, as appropriate, shall be the defendant.
Id. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5 governs all civil actions brought under Title VII. The Rehabilita
tion Act of 1973 makes the remedies of 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16 available to persons claiming
discrimination on the basis of handicap. 29 U.S.C. § 794a(a)(1) (1988). Accordingly, the
procedural requirements of Title VII also apply to claims brought under the Rehabilitation
Act. Id.
23. Baldwiri County Welcome Center v. Brown, 466 U.S. 147, 148 (1984) (per
curiam).
24. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-I6(c) (1988).
25. FED. R. CIV. P. 3.
26. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-I6(c) (1988).
27. Schiavone v. Fortune, 477 U.S. 21, 31 (1986); FED. R. CIV. P. 15(c). For further
discussion of this requirement, see infra text accompanying notes 58-74.
28. Warren v. Department of Army, 867 F.2d 1156,1159 (8th Cir. 1989); Johnson v.
United States Postal Serv., 861 F.2d 1475, 1478 (10th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 54
(1989); Mondy v. Secretary of Army, 845 F.2d 1051, 1052-53 (D.C. Cir. 1988); Paulk V.
Department of Air Force, 830 F.2d 79,81 (7th Cir. 1987); Williams v. Army & Air Force
Exch. Serv., 830 F.2d 27, 28 (3d Cir. 1987); McGuinness v. United States Postal Serv., 744
F.2d 1318, 1322-23 (7th Cir. 1984); Cooper v. United States Postal Serv., 740 F.2d 714,
715,717 (9th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1022 (1985).
22.
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rather than the agency head who is the named defendant and who
responds to the charge. 29
B.

Proceeding In Forma Pauperis

An aggrieved individual without sufficient assets to finance litiga
tion may attempt to proceed in forma pauperis. 30 The in forma
pauperis statute allows persons unable to afford the cost of litigation to
file civil actions in the federal courts without payment of fees or costs
and to request appointment of counsel by the COurt. 31 Pursuant to the
statute, such simultaneous requests must be accompanied by an affida
vit of poverty to the appropriate federal court including a statement of
29. See L. MODJESKA, supra note 21, § 2.7, at 219-21. Perhaps employees name the
agency rather than the agency head as the defendant because employees generally consider
the agency to be their employer, rather than the individual who is the agency head. See,
e.g., Johnson v. United States Postal Serv., 113 F.R.D. 73, 77 (D. Colo. 1986), aff'd, 861
F.2d 1475 (10th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 54 (1989). See supra note 21 for a
discussion of the administrative process.
30. 28 U.S.C. § 1915 (1988).
31. Id. The cases discussed in this Comment involve the use of the federal in forma
pauperis statute in Title VII cases. However, Title VII also independently provides for a
waiver of fees and the appointment of counsel. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f) (1988). At least one
court has ruled that 28 U.S.C. § 1915 does not apply to requests for counsel under Title VII
and that instead, the provisions of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f), apply exclusively.
Edmonds v. E.I. duPont deNemours & Co., 315 F. Supp. 523, 525 (D. Kan. 1970). Other
courts (based upon their silence on this matter) have apparently found by implication that a
Title VII plaintiff may proceed under 28 U.S.C. § 1915 rather than under 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e-5(f). See, e.g., Warren v. Department of Army, 867 F.2d 1156 (8th Cir. 1989);
Johnson v. United States Postal Serv., 861 F.2d 1475 (10th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 110 S.
Ct. 54 (1989); Mondyv. Secretary of Army, 845 F.2d 1051 (D.C. Cir. 1988); Paulk v.
Department of Air Force, 830 F.2d 79 (7th Cir. 1987). For a discussion of these cases, see
infra notes 75-166 and accompanying text.
There appears to be little or no precedent regarding the circumstances in which coun
sel will be appointed in the case of a civil in forma pauperis proceeding. The United States
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia is the only circuit to have published a hand
book containing a procedure regarding these cases. UNITED STATES CoURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE DISTRICT OF CoLUMBIA CIRCUIT, HANDBOOK OF PRACTICE AND INTERNAL
PROCEDURES ch. VI (1987) [hereinafter CoURT OF APPEALS HANDBOOK], reprinted in
D.C. FEDERAL CoURTS HANDBOOK § 1.331, at 149-54 (S. Glasser & A. Glasser eds.
1990). This handbook states in relevant part:
The Criminal Justice Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3006A, does not provide for the ap
pointment of counsel in non-criminal cases. Thus, even though a party in a civil
appeal may be granted leave to proceed in forma pauperis, counsel will not ordi
narily be provided by the [c]ourt. The appellant may file a motion for the ap
pointment of counsel. If the [c]ourt grants the motion, it may refer the appellant
to a legal aid organization, or a law school clinical program, or it may appoint a
private attorney who has indicated a willingness to serve without compensation in
non-criminal cases.
CoURT OF ApPEALS HANDBOOK, supra, at 29, reprinted in D.C. FEDERAL CoURTS HAND
BOOK, supra, at 151.
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the nature of the action and the entitlement to relief. 32 The court may
dismiss the application if it deems that the affidavit of poverty contains
false statements or that the action is frivolous or malicious. 33
Once a party has filed a motion to proceed in forma pauperis,
differences exist among the courts of appeals as to when and whether a
court will authorize issuance of a complaint. 34 A court must deter
mine whether the plaintiff meets the initial requirements to proceed in
forma pauperis. 3S To meet these requirements, the plaintiff must
demonstrate indigency.36 The court must then decide whether the
plaintiff's action is frivolous. 37
Two approaches have developed regarding when courts make this
See 28 U.S.C. § 1915 (1988). The statute states in relevant part:
(a) Any court of the United States may authorize the commencement, prose
cution or defense of any suit, action or proceeding, civil or criminal, or appeal
therein, without prepayment of fees and costs or security therefor, by a person
who makes affidavit that he is unable to pay such costs or give security therefor.
Such affidavit shall state the nature of the action, defense or appeal and affiant's
belief that he is entitled to redress.
An appeal may not be taken in forma pauperis if the trial court certifies in
writing that it is not taken in good faith.
32.

(c) The officers ofthe court shall issue and serve all process, and perform all
duties in such cases. Witnesses shall attend as in other cases, and the same reme
dies shall be available as are provided for by law in other cases.
(d) The court may request an attorney to represent any such person unable
to employ counsel and may dismiss the case if the allegation of poverty is untrue,
or if satisfied that the action is frivolous or malicious.
Id.

Courts and commentators have noted that the statute balances an indigent's right to
have access to the judicial system against the potential for abuse because the statute explic
itly permits the court to dismiss frivolous claims. See Jones v. Morris, 777 F.2d 1277, 1279
(7th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1053 (1986); Phillips v. Mashburn, 746 F.2d 782, 784
(11th Cir. 1984); Catz & Guyer, Federal In Forma Pauperis Litigation: In Search ofJudi
cial Standards, 31 RUTGERS L. REV. 655 (1978); Feldman, Indigents in the Federal Courts:
The In Forma Pauperis Statute-Equality and Frivolity, 54 FORDHAM L. REv. 413 (1985);
Note, Petitions to Sue In Forma Pauperis In Federal Courts: Standards and Procedures for
the Exercise of Judicial Discretion, 56 B.U.L. REv. 745 (1976).
33. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a) (1988). The federal in forma pauperis statute is notably
lacking in specific guidelines and procedures to govern the federal courts in considering
motions to proceed in forma pauperis. For commentary on this issue, see Catz & Guyer,
supra note 32; Note, supra note 32.
34. Note, supra note 32, at 753-54. The discussion in this Comment relates to
problems arising due to the varying approaches of the United States courts of appeals re
garding the issuance of a complaint. The case law is relatively silent about standards to be
used relative to the appointment of counsel in civil proceedings. See supra note 31.
35. McCone v. Holiday Inn Convention Center, 797 F.2d 853, 854 (10th Cir. 1986).
36. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a) (1988).
37. Id.
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determination of the seriousness of the action. 38 Under the first alter
native, the court will consider before the docketing of the complaint
whether or not the petition is frivolous based solely on consideration
of the motion to proceed in forma pauperis. 39 Alternatively, the court
will allow the plaintiff's complaint to be docketed, postponing consid
eration as to whether or not the claim is frivolous.40 If the court opts
for the second alternative, it may authorize issuance of service imme
diately upon filing,41 or it may postpone service of process until after it
considers whether or not the complaint is frivolous. 42
For a plaintiff facing the thirty-day limitations period of Title
VII, the effect is the same whether the court postpones granting the in
forma pauperis motion until after docketing of the complaint or
whether it dismisses the action before docketing and service. 43 In
either case, the delay may preclude notice of the suit to the appropri
ate parties during the thirty-day limitations period. Insufficient notice
during the limitations period may preclude relation back under Rule
15(c) of any amended complaint and result in dismissal of the action.44
Once a court has granted leave to proceed in forma pauperis, it is
the responsibility of the United States Marshal to serve the summons
and complaint on behalf of the plaintiff. 4s If service is to be made
upon the United States government it must be done in accordance
with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(d)(4) which requires service
upon the appropriate United States Attorney and the United States
Attorney General. 46
38. Note, supra note 32, at 753-54.
39. Paulk v. Department of Air Force, 830 F.2d 79, 82 (7th Cir. 1987).
40. McCone v. Holiday Inn Convention Center, 797 F.2d 853, 854 (1Oth Cir. 1986).
41. FED. R. CIv. P. 4(a) ("Upon the filing of the complaint the clerk shall forthwith
issue a summons ...."); FED. R. CIV. P. 4(d) ("The summons and complaint shall be
served together.").
42. McCone, 797 F.2d at 854.
43. See Johnson v. United States Postal Serv., 861 F.2d 1475, 1476, 1478 (10th Cir.
1988), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 54 (1989); Paulk, 830 F.2d at 80 n.l, 81.
44. For a discussion of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(c), see infra text accom
panying notes 48-74.
45. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(c) (1988); FED. R. CIV. P. 4(c)(2)(B)(i); see a/so Rochon V.
Dawson, 828 F.2d 1107, 1110 (5th Cir. 1987) ("[A] plaintiff proceeding in forma pauperis
is entitled to rely upon service by the U.S. Marshals ...."). Normally service of summons
and complaint shall "be served by any person who is not a party and is not less than 18
years of age." FED. R. CIV. P. 4(c)(2)(A). The Rule specifies the narrow circumstances
where the United States Marshal is required to effect service. FED. R. CIV. P. 4(c)(2)(B).
46. See FED. R. CIV. P. 4(d)(4). The Rule states that service shall be made:
Upon the United States, by delivering a copy of the summons and of the
complaint to the United States attorney for the district in which the action is
brought or to an assistant United States attorney or clerical employee designated
by the United States attorney in a writing filed with the clerk of the court and by
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The Necessity of Naming the Proper Defendant: The Standards
for Relation Back and Schiavone v. Fortune

Problems arise when a plaintiff has erred under the second re
quirement of Title VII and has named and served the wrong defendant
within the thirty-day limitations period. Once the court has notified
the plaintiff of this error, he or she will normally attempt to amend the
complaint in order to name the proper defendant. 47
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure determine the standards
required to allow parties to amend their pleadings during the course of
litigation. Rule IS(c) states the criteria for determining whether or
not an amended pleading will relate back to the date of the original
pleading in order to satisfy any requisite limitations period. 48 The
Rule allows the addition of both parties and claims. 49
In 1966, Rule IS(c) was amended to indicate the standards to be
applied when an amendment changes the name of the defendant and
sending a copy of the summons and of the complaint by registered or certified
mail to the Attorney General of the United States at Washington, District of
Columbia, and in any action attacking the validity of an order of an officer or
agency of the United States not made a party, by also sending a copy of the
summons and of the complaint by registered or certified mail to such officer or
agency.

Id.
47. Mondy v. Secretary of Army, 845 F.2d 1051, 1054 (D.C. Cir. 1988); Paulk, 830
F.2d at 81.
48. FED. R. CIV. P. IS(c). The Rule states:
Whenever the claim or defense asserted in the amended pleading arose out of
the conduct, transaction, or occurrence set forth or attempted to be set forth in
the original pleading, the amendment relates back to the date of the original.
pleading. An amendment changing the party against whom a claim is asserted
relates back if the foregoing provision is satisfied and, within the period provided
by law for commencing the action against the party to be brought in by amend
ment, that party (1) has received such notice of the institution of the action that
the party will not be prejudiced in maintaining a defense on the merits, and (2)
knew or should have known that, but for a mistake concerning the identity of the
proper party, the action would have been brought against the party.
The delivery or mailing of process to the United States Attorney, or the
United States Attorney's designee, or the Attorney General of the United States,
or an agency or officer who would have been a proper defendant if named, satis
fies the requirement of clauses (1) and (2) hereof with respect to the United States
or any agency or officer thereof to be brought into the action as a defendant.

Id.
Accordingly, an amendment that relates back will be treated as having been filed as of
the date of the original complaint. If relation back is allowed, the amended complaint will
not be subject to attack on the basis of a statute of limitations.
49. Id. The addition of a claim will generally be allowed where the pleading has
been timely filed and served on the proper party. See Schiavone v. Fortune, 477 U.S. 21
(1986). See infra notes 58-74 and accompanying text for a discussion of Schiavone and the
requirements for relation back under Rule 15(c).
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to allow imputed notice of an action to a federal agency or officer
when service is made upon the United States Attorney or Attorney
General. 50 The Advisory Committee Notes which accompanied these
additions indicated that the problem of amended pleadings changing
the name of the party defendant "ha[d] arisen most acutely in certain
actions by private parties against officers or agencies of the United
States."5 I The Advisory Committee also discussed several cases where
Social Security claimants had mistakenly named "the United States,
the Department of HEW, the 'Federal Security Administration' (a
nonexistent agency), and a Secretary who had retired from the office
. . . ."52 After the expiration of the requisite limitations period, the
claimants attempted to amend their complaints to name the proper
defendant, the Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare. 53 The
motions to amend were denied on the basis that they amounted to new
proceedings and were therefore untimely. 54 The Advisory Committee
noted that the policy of a limitations period "would not have been
offended by allowing relation back in the[se] situations"55 because "the
government was put on notice of the claim within the stated period. "56
The Advisory Committee expressly noted that, "[i]n these circum
stances, characterization of the amendment as a new proceeding is not

so. FED. R. CIv. P. 15(c). The second and third sentences of the present rule were
amended in 1966. For the current text of Rule 15(c), see supra note 48.
51. FED. R. CIV. P. 15(c) advisory committee's note.
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Id. (citing Cohn v. Federal Sec. Admin., 199 F. Supp. 884, 885 (W.O.N.Y.
1961); Cunningham v. United States, 199 F. Supp. 541 (W.O. Mo. 1958); Hall v. Depart
ment of HEW, 199 F. Supp. 833 (S.~. Tex. 1960); Sandridge v. Folsom, 200 F. Supp. 25
(M.D. Tenn. 1959».
55. Id.
56. Id. In a critique of Rule 15(c) and Schiavone, Professor Robert Brussack sug
gested that the Advisory Committee was perhaps tnistaken in its assumption that the gov
ernment received notice before expiration of the limitations period. Brussack, Outrageous
Fortune: The Case for Amending Rule 15(c) Again, 61 S. CAL. L. REv. 671, 681 (1988).
For additional commentary on Rule 15(c) since Schiavone, see Bauer, Schiavone· An Un
Fortune-ate Illustration of the Supreme Court's Role as Interpreter of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure, 63 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 720 (1988); Epter, An Un-Fortune-Ate Decision:
The Aftermath of the Supreme Court's Eradication of the Relation-Back Doctrine, 17 FLA.
ST. U.L. REV. 713 (1990); Lewis, The Excessive History of Federal Rule 15(c) and its Les
sons for Civil Rules Revision, 85 MICH. L. REv. 1507 (1987); Note, Schiavone v. Fortune:
A Clarification ofthe Relation Back Doctrine, 36 CATH. U.L. REv. 499 (1987); Note, Schia
vone v. Fortune: Notice Becomes a Threshold Requirement for Relation Back Under Fed
eral Rule 15(c), 65 N.C.L. REv. 598 (1987) [hereinafter Note, Threshold Requirement];
Note, Looking Forward: A Fairer Application of the Relation Back Provisions of Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 15(c), 63 N.Y.U. L. REv. 131 (1988) [hereinafter Note, Looking
Forward]. See infra notes 295-303 and accompanying text for further discussion of the
Brussack article.
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responsive to the reality, but is merely question-begging; and to deny
relation back is to defeat unjustly the claimant's opportunity to prove
his case. "S7
The 1986 Supreme Court decision of Schiavone v. Fortune S8 ad
dressed the application of Rule 15(c) "to a less-than-precise denomina
tion of a defendant in complaints filed in federal court near the
expiration of the period of limitations."s9 In Schiavone, three parties
alleging defamation filed suit in federal district court against Fortune
magazine. 60 Each complaint named Fortune as the defendant. 61 The
named defendant should have been Time, Inc., the publisher of For
tune magazine. 62 After expiration of a one-year limitations period, the
plaintiffs amended their complaints to name "Fortune, also known as
Time, Incorporated" as the defendant. 63 Time, Inc. alleged that it had
not received notice of the suit within the limitations period, and there
fore, the amendments could not relate back under Rule 15(c) to the
original date of filing against Fortune. 64
The Court agreed with Time, Inc. and refused to allow the
amended complaints to relate back to the date of the original plead
ings. 6S In its decision, the Court set out a four-part test to determine
57. FED. R. CIV. P. 15(c) advisory committee's note (citing Byse, Suing the "Wrong"
Defendant in Judicial Review of Federal Administrative Action: Proposals for Reform, 77
HARV. L. REV. 40 (1963». In this influential article, Byse essentially suggested the amend
ments to Rule 15(c) which were subsequently adopted in 1966. Id. For a discussion of the
Byse article and the 1966 amendments in light of Schiavone, see Brussack, supra note 56.
58. 477 U.S. 21 (1986).
59. Id. at 22.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 22-23.
62. Id. at 23.
63. Id.
64. Id. at 24. The magazine containing the alleged defamation had a pUblication
date of May 31, 1982. Id. at 22. The Schiavone petitioners filed their complaints on May 9,
1983, and mailed the complaints to Time's agent on May 20, 1983. Id. at 22-23. Time
received the complaints on May 23, 1983, but refused service because Time was not named
as the defendant. Id. at 23. On July 18, 1983, the petitioners attempted to amend their
complaints naming Time, Inc. as the defendant. Id. While the district court did not rule
on this issue, the court of appeals found that substantial distribution of the magazine took
place on May 19, 1982. /d. at 25. Accordingly, no service was attempted upon any party
prior to the expiration of the limitations period on May 19, 1983. Id. at 29.
65. Id. at 27. The Schiavone decision attempted to resolve the conflict among the
courts of appeals regarding the issue of relation back. Id. at 22. The conflict was between a
strict construction of Rule 15(c), as adopted by Schiavone, and a more liberal standard
which allowed relation back when a new party defendant was named after expiration of a
limitations period. Compare Hughes v. United States, 701 F.2d 56 (7th Cir. 1982) (no
relation back where plaintiff originally named the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the
United States Department of Justice and later attempted to amend the complaint to prop
erly name the United States) and Watson v. Unipress, Inc., 733 F.2d 1386 (10th Cir. 1984)
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whether an amendment will be permitted under Rule 15(c).66 The
Court stated:
Relation back is dependent upon four factors, all of which must be
satisfied: (1) the basic claim must have arisen out ofthe conduct set
forth in the original pleading; (2) the party to be brought in must
have received such notice that it will not be prejudiced in maintain
ing its defense; (3) that party must or should have known that, but
for a mistake concerning identity, the action would have been
brought against it; and (4) the second and third requirements must
have been fulfilled within the prescribed limitations period. 67

The Court determined that notice to Time, Inc. had occurred af
ter the end of the limitations period as no party had received notice
before the end of one year. 68 The amended complaint, therefore, failed
to satisfy the fourth requirement of the test. 69 In support of this con
clusion, the Court in Schiavone relied upon the 1966 Advisory Com
mittee's Notes to the Rule 15(c) amendments. 70
The Court noted that the Advisory Committee would also require
notice within the limitations period to the party brought in by the
amendment.71 The Court dismissed the plaintiffs' contention that
Rule 15(c) should be read in conjunction with Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 4, which requires service of the summons within 120 days
(no relation back where plaintiff originally named a John Doe defendant and later at
tempted to amend the complaint identifying the defendant) with Ingram v. Kumar, SSS
F.2d 566 (2d Cir. 1978) (court allowed relation back where plaintiff amended the complaint
to change middle initial of defendant which also entailed notice to an entirely different
party), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 940 (1979) and Kirk v. Cronvich, 629 F.2d 404 (5th Cir.
19S0) (court allowed relation back where plaintiff originally sued sheriff's office and
amended complaint to name the sheriff as an individual).
66. Schiavone, 477 U.S. at 29. This four-part test is essentially a restatement of the
elements of Rule 15(c).

67.

Id.

6S. Id. at 30.
69. Id. The Court also discussed an "identity-of-interest" exception developed by
some ofthe courts of appeals to allow relation back where another defendant is named after
the expiration of the limitations period. Id. at 28-29. The exception provides that "[t]imely
filing of a complaint, and notice within the limitations period to the party named in the
complaint, permit imputation of notice to a subsequently named and sufficiently related
party" and would, if allowed, arguably satisfy the third factor of the four-part test. Id. at
29. The Court did not apply the exception, stating that since neither Time, Inc. nor For
tune had received notice until after the expiration of the limitations period, no timely notice
could be imputed to Time. Id. (citing Hernandez Jimenez v. Calero Toledo, 604 F.2d 99,
102-03 (1st Cir. 1979); Norton v. International Harvester Co., 627 F.2d IS, 20-21 (7th Cir.
19S0». For a discussion of the identity-of-interest exception and Schiavone, see Note,
Threshold Requirement, supra note 56.
70. Schiavone, 417 U.S. at 30-31.
71. Id. at 31.
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. after filing the complaint. 72 Focusing on the history of the amendment
rather than the literal wording of the Rule, the plaintiffs had alleged
that Rule IS(c) was amended in 1966 "for the express purpose of al
lowing relation back of a change in the name or identity of a defendant
when, although the limitations period for filing had run, the period
allowed by Rule 4 for timely service had not yet expired."73 The
Court rejected this argument stating that Rule 4 deals only with pro
cess, or the time allowed "for the service of a timely filed complaint,"
whereas the emphasis of Rule 1S(c) is upon the commencement of the
action, noting that it is Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 3 that defines
commencement of the action. 74
II.

JUDICIAL TREATMENT OF EQUITABLE TOLLING AND
RELATION BACK

The strict reading given to Rule 1S(c) by the United States
Supreme Court in Schiavone has resurrected the problems presumably
addressed by the 1966 amendments to the Rule. 7s The Court's con
struction of Rule IS(c) "leaves potentially meritorious claims unjustifi
ably vulnerable to the limitations defense on account of easily made
pleading mistakes."76 The following Section introduces five cases in
which courts have addressed the issue of equitable tolling of the stat
ute of limitations where a Title VII, in forma pauperis plaintiff, at
tempting to sue the federal government, has not named the proper
defendant during the limitations period. In each case, the plaintiff at
tempted to amend his or her complaint to correct the name of the
defendant pursuant to the relation back provisions of Rule IS(c).77 In
two cases, the court refused to allow the amendment,78 while in the
other three cases, the plaintiffs were allowed to amend their com
plaints by naming the proper parties. 79
72. Id. at 30; FED. R. CIY. P. 4(j).
73. Schiavone, 477 U.S. at 26 (citing Brief for Petitioners at 5).
74. Id. at 30; FED. R. CIv. P. 3 ("A civil action is commenced by filing a complaint
with the court.").
75. See generally Brussack, supra note 56.
76. Id. at 672.
77. FED. R. CIV. P. 15(c).
78. Soto v. United States Postal Serv., 905 F.2d 537 (1st Cir. 1990), cert. denied, III
S. Ct. 679 (1991); Johnson v. United States Postal Serv., 861 F.2d 1475 (10th Cir. 1988),
cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 54 (1989).
79. Warren v. Department of Army, 867 F.2d 1156 (8th Cir. 1989); Mondy v. Secre
tary of Army, 845 F.2d 1051 (D.C. Cir. 1988); Paulk v. Department of Air Force, 830 F.2d
79 (7th Cir. 1987).
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No Equitable Tolling to Allow Relation Back
1. Johnson v. United States Postal Service

In Johnson v. United States Postal Service,80 a pro se plaintiff al
leging employment discrimination filed a motion to proceed in forma
pauperis five days after receiving a right to sue letter from the
EEOC.81 Four days later, the district court granted the plaintiff's mo
tion to proceed in forma pauperis, but denied the appointment of
counsel.82 On the final day of the thirty-day limitations period, the
plaintiff, proceeding without an attorney, filed his complaint, naming
the Postal Service as the defendant83 rather than the Postmaster Gen
eral, as the statute required. 84 The district court then directed the
United States Marshal to serve the complaint and summons. 8S Service
was not effected on the Postal Service until several days later.86 The
United States Marshal did not serve the appropriate United States At
torney or the Attorney General, as required under the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure. 87 Five months later, the district court issued an
order to show cause why service was incomplete. 88 The plaintiff then
obtained an attorney and served the United States Attorney and the
United States Attorney General. 89 The Postal Service moved for dis
missal based upon the plaintiff's failure to name the proper defend
ant. 90 The trial court granted the motion, finding that the plaintiff had
not named or served the correct party and thus, could not amend his
80. 861 F.2d 1475 (10th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 54 (1989).
81. Id. at 1476. The plaintiff had been dismissed from his position as a bulk mail
handler allegedly due to a disability of his right foot. Id. Accordingly, the basis for his
complaint fell under section 501 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (codified as amended at
29 U.S.C. § 791 (1988». Id. at 1477. This statute is governed by the limitational require
ments of 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-I6(c). See supra note 22 for the text of the statute.
82. Johnson, 861 F.2d at 1476. Little authority exists regarding a court's discretion
to grant or deny the appointment of counsel to in forma pauperis plaintiffs. See Warren v.
Department of Army, 867 F.2d 1156 (8th Cir. 1989); Johnson, 861 F.2d 1475; Mondy, 845
F.2d 1051; Paulk, 830 F.2d 79; Johnson v. United States Postal Serv., 113 F.R.D. 73 (D.
Colo. 1986), aff'd, 861 F.2d 1475 (10th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 54 (1989); Catz
& Guyer, supra note 32; Note, Controlling and Deterring Frivolous In Forma Pauperis Com
plaints 55 FORDHAM L. REv. 1165 (1987); Note, supra note 32; see also supra note 31.
83. Johnson, 861 F.2d at 1476. The plaintiff also named his local union as a defend
ant. The claim against the union was dismissed by the district court. Id.
84. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-I6(c) (1988). The statute requires service upon the "head of
the department" as the appropriate defendant. Id. For the text of this statutory provision,
see supra note 22.
85. Johnson, 861 F.2d at 1476.
86. Id.
87. FED. R. av. P. 4(c)(2)(B)(i), 4(d)(4), 4(d)(5).
88. Johnson, 861 F.2d at 1476.
89. Id. The plaintiff never named or served the Postmaster General. Id. at 1478.
90. Id. at 1477.
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complaint. 91 Accordingly, the matter was dismissed for lack of sub
ject matter jurisdiction. 92
In Johnson, the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Cir
cuit affirmed the decision of the trial court93 and upheld summary
judgment in favor of the defendant. 94 In so doing, the court would not
allow the plaintiff to amend his complaint to name the proper defend
ant. The Johnson majority ruled that an amendment would not meet
the fourth criteria of the test outlined in Schiavone v. Fortune,9S finding
that no notice of the suit had been given to the defendant during the
limitations period. 96 The plaintiff argued that he was dependent upon
the United States Marshal for service on both the named defendant
and, pursuant to the requirements of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
4, the United States Attorney and the Attorney General. 97
91. Johnson v. United States Postal Serv., 113 F.R.D. 73, 74, 77 (D. Colo. 1986),
aff'd, 861 F.2d 1475 (lOth Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 54 (1989).
92. Id.
93. Johnson, 861 F.2d at 1476.
94. Id.
95. Id. at 1480 & n.5 (citing Schiavone v. Fortune, 477 U.S. 21 (1986»; see supra text
accompanying notes 58-74.
96. Id. at 1480. The Johnson majority also rejected application of the identity-of
interest exception noting that there was no "notice within the limitations period." Id. at
1481-82. For a discussion of the Supreme Court's treatment of the identity-of-interest ex
ception in Schiavone, see supra note 69.
97. Id. at 1480-81. For the text of Rule 4(d)(4), see supra note 46. Rule 15(c) pro
vides that service upon the United States Attorney or the Attorney General constitutes
sufficient notice of an action to allow relation back with respect to suits against the United
States or any of its agencies or officers. FED. R. CIV. P. 15(c). For the text of Rule 15(c),
see supra note 48. Although this second paragraph of the Rule appears to be as "plain" in
its meaning as the first paragraph (Schiavone v. Fortune, 477 U.S. 21, 30 (1986», at least
one court has chosen to ignore this section of 15(c). Stewart v. United States Postal Serv.,
649 F. Supp. 1531 (S.D. N.Y. 1986). In Stewart, a pro se plaintiff, alleging employment
discrimination under Title VII, received an extension of time for service of his complaint
from the district court. Id. at 1532. The plaintiff properly served the United States Attor
ney and the Attorney General within the extended period but did not serve the Postmaster
General. Id. at 1533. The court did not apply or discuss the provisions of Rule 15(c)
allowing substitute service on the Attorney General or the United States Attorney. In
stead, the court strictly applied 42 U.S.c. § 2000e-16, citing Brown v. General Services
Administration, 425 U.S. 820 (1976). In Brown, the Supreme Court ruled that 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e-16 is the "exclusive, pre-emptive administrative and judicial scheme for the redress
of federal employment discrimination." Brown, 425 U.S. at 829. The Stewart court, there
fore, concluded that the plaintiff had to serve the Postmaster General during the thirty days
in order to allow the relation back of amendments. Stewart, 649 F. Supp. at 1533. None of
the United States courts of appeals have followed this interpretation. Reliance on Brown in
this respect appears to be somewhat misguided. The essential holding of Brown was that
other remedies for employment discrimination available at the time of enactment of 42
U.S.C. § 2000e-16 in 1972 were preempted by this amendment which allowed suits against
federal defendants. Brown, 425 U.S. at 829. Brown is silent regarding the application of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to the statute.
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The court rejected the plaintiff's argument that his problem was
caused by the Marshal's inadequate service,98 and blamed the failure
of service upon "the inadequacy of the plaintiff's complaint"99 since it
was filed on the last day of the limitations period. The court found
that the Marshal was not at fault as the service was within the 120
days permissible under Rule 4(j).IOO The court noted that even if the
United States Attorney or Attorney General had been served by the
Marshal in accordance with Rule 4(d) at the time of Mr. Johnson's
filing, service still would have been inadequate unless it had been ef
fected on the day of filing. 101 In addition, the court rejected the plain
tiff's contention that the thirty-day limitations period should be
equitably tolled. loo Relying on Tenth Circuit precedent,103 the court
acknowledged the existence of the doctrine of equitable tolling but
stated that the limitations period would be tolled only where there had
been some "active deception."I04 The court concluded that the plain
tiff "was not 'lulled into inaction' in any way that [rose] to the active
deception standard" and, therefore, the plaintiff did not present an ap
propriate case for application of equitable tolling. lOS
The Johnson dissent argued that this case presented sufficient evi
dence to allow the court to exercise its general power to equitably toll
the statute of limitations period, and that relation back under Rule
98. Johnson, 861 F.2d at 1480.
99. Id.
100. Id. The Rule states in relevant part:
If a service of the summons and complaint is not made upon a defendant
within 120 days after the filing of the complaint and the party on whose behalf
such service was required cannot show good cause why such service was not
made within that period, the action shall be dismissed as to that defendant with
out prejudice upon the court's own initiative with notice to such party or upon
motion.
FED. R. CIv. P. 4(j).
101. Johnson, 861 F.2d at 1480.
102. Id.
103. Id. at 1481 (citing Martinez v. Orr, 738 F.2d 1107, 1110-11 (10th Cir. 1984);
Gonzalez-Aller Ba1seyro v. GTE Lenkurt, Inc., 702 F.2d 857, 859 (10th Cir. 1983».
104. Johnson, 861 F.2d at 1481.
105. Id. Another issue regarding equitable tolling in suits against the federal govern
ment is whether Title VII's time limits are jurisdictional or limitational. If the time periods
are viewed as jurisdictional, the strict thirty-day limit for filing and service must be met as a
prerequisite to suit. Paulk v. Department of Air Force, 830 F.2d 79, 81 (7th Cir. 1987)
(citing Sims v. Heckler, 725 F.2d 1143 (7th Cir. 1984». However, if the limits are viewed
as limitational, they are then subject to "waiver, estoppel, and equitable tolling." Zipes v.
Trans World Airlines, 455 U.S. 385, 393 (1982). In a recent Title VII decision, the United
States Supreme Court resolved this issue and held that "the same rebuttable presumption of
equitable tolling applicable to suits against private defendants should also apply to suits
against the United States." Irwin v. Veterans Admin., 111 S. Ct. 453, 457 (1990). For a
discussion of Irwin, see infra notes 215-26 and accompanying text.
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15(c) should have'been allowed. 106 The dissent proposed that once the
court granted the in forma pauperis motion, the court "was required
by federal law to properly serve [the] defendant."I07 The dissent rea
soned, that this resulted in "reasonable reliance [by the plaintift] on the
process authorized by statute and implemented by officers of the
COurt"108 and that, therefore, the plaintiff was actually "lulled into in
action."I09 In addition, the dissent argued that the provisions ofthe in
forma pauperis statute, which direct that the court, via the United
States Marshal, serve process and "perform all duties" on behalf of the
plaintiff,110 "impose[] a special duty upon officers of the court to assist
impecunious and generally unsophisticated plaintiffs to navigate safely
through the procedural maze created by applicable statutes and
rules."111
The dissent would have excused the plaintiff's delay in filing the
complaint and rejected the majority's position that the Marshal was'
excused from failure to effect timely service. The dissent disagreed
with the majority's argument that the plaintiff's failure to file the com
plaint until the final day of the limitations period and the 120-day pe
riod of Rule 4 for service excused the Marshal from failure to effect
timely service. 112 The dissent argued that "a plaintiff could be com
pletely out of court even though the Marshal proceeded within the
time limit permitted by [Rule 4(j)]."113 The dissent noted that even if
the plaintiff's complaint had been filed within one week of the court's
denial of the motion for appointment of counsel (instead of the actual
twenty-one days), "the Marshal would still have the same 120 days
within which to act."114 Therefore, the plaintiff would still be unable
106. Johnson, 861 F.2d at 1482-89 (McKay, J., dissenting).
/d. at 1486.
Id. The dissent further stated:
The majority draws an artificial distinction between circumstances where one
party is explicitly told something that leads to the forfeiting of rights and situa
tions such as the present one where reliance on a court order is not deemed overt
enough to qualify. I respectfully submit that there is no principled basis for that
distinction. The issue is reliance and how that reliance is fostered, regardless of
the method employed. This is especially true when dealing with an unsophistica
ted plaintiff such as Mr. Johnson.
Id. at 1487.
109. Id.
110. Id. at 1486 (citing 29 [sic] U.S.C. § 1915(c». For the full text of the in forma
pauperis statute, see supra note 32.
111. Johnson, 861 F.2d at 1486.
112. Id.
113. Id. at 1486 n.lO.
114. /d. at 1486. The dissent noted that the record revealed no evidence of undue
delay by the plaintiff in filing his complaint. Id. In a separate argument, the dissent pro
107.
108.
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to present his claim even if service was effected by the Marshal in com
pliance with Rule 4 with a reasonable delay of "fifteen or twenty days
after the complaint was filed." I IS The dissent further argued that this
outcome rose to an " 'active deception' which 'in some extraordinary
way [prevents [a] plaintift] from asserting his or her rights,''' and
should result in equitable tolling,116
2. Soto v. United States Postal Service

In Soto v. United States Postal Service,1l7 a case similar to John
son, a party alleging employment discrimination by the Postal Service
filed a motion to proceed in forma pauperis and a complaint in the
form of a letter, thirty days after receiving a right-ta-sue letter from
the EEOC. I 18 The United States District Court for the District of Pu
erto Rico granted the motion.1l9 The complaint was officially dock
eted thirty-five days after receipt of the right-ta-sue letter.l20 The
Postal Service and the United States Attorney in San Juan received
process approximately five months later,121 The Postal Service moved
for dismissal of the complaint and the plaintiff, having obtained coun
sel, filed a motion to amend naming the proper defendant.122 The dis
trict court adopted the recommendations of a magistrate who found
that Schiavone barred the plaintiff's attempt to amend. 123 The district
court further found that the circumstances did not warrant the appli
posed that timely notice to the Postmaster General could be imputed from notice to the
United States Postal Service under the identity-<>f-interest exception, thus satisfying the
third factor of Schiavone's four-part test. Id. at 1488-89. Citing the dissent in Gonzales v.
Secretary of Air Force, 824 F.2d 392 (5th Cir. 1987) (Brown, J., dissenting), cert. denied,
485 U.S. 969 (1988), the Johnson dissent argued that the head of an agency and the agency
itself are functionally the same for the purposes of defending a Title VII suit. Johnson, 861
F.2d at 1488-89 (McKay, J., dissenting). The dissenting opinions in Johnson and Gonzales
both argued that the same people within the agency or department receive notice of the
suit, appear in court, prepare all pleadings, etc., regardless of whether the agency head or
the agency itself is named. Id. For a discussion of the Johnson majority's position on the
identity-<>f-interest exception and the Schiavone discussion on identity-<>f-interest, see supra
notes 96 & 69, respectively. For the text of the Schiavone four-factor relation back test, see
supra text accompanying note 67.
115. Johnson, 861 F.2d at 1486 (McKay, J., dissenting).
116. Id. at 1486 n.lO.
117. 905 F.2d 537 (1st Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 679 (1991).
118. Id. at 539. If the court had accepted the letter as the complaint and had dock
eted it upon receipt, the case may have had a different result.
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. Id.
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cation of equitable tolling. l24
The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit adopted
the district court's findings. The court of appeals relied heavily upon
the plaintiff's failure to file his complaint until the final day of the
limitations period. l2S The court found that the plain meaning of Rule
lS(c) "may not be tempered merely by the elements of hardship and
sympathy."l26 The court noted that plaintiff Soto's claim was
"doomed from the outset, because only virtually instantaneous service
would have preserved his ability to later amend to add the proper
party."l27 The court declined to equitably toll the limitations period
finding that there was no "affirmative showing" of inequity which
would justify tolling. l28
The decision rejected the plaintiff's contention that the right-to
sue letter was confusing, noting that it was apparent from the context
of the letter that the "plaintiff must name the head of an agency or
department."l29 The court also rejected the plaintiff's arguments that
equity should allow tolling as he was proceeding pro se and because
process did not issue in a timely manner. l30 The court noted that
there was no active deception by any governmental party, and that it
would have been impossible for the court to effectuate timely service
due to the plaintiff's failure to file until the final day of the limitations
period. 131
The Johnson and Soto decisions present one end of a spectrum in
which courts have declined to use equitable tolling to free Title VII, in
forma pauperis plaintiffs from the time limitations of Rule lS(c). The
following discussion presents three cases which represent the other
end of the spectrum. In these cases, the equitable tolling doctrine was
used to allow Title VII, in forma pauperis plaintiffs to amend their
complaints after expiration of the limitations period.

B. Equitable Tolling Employed to Allow Relation Back
In contrast to Johnson and Soto, the United States Courts of Ap
peals for the District of Columbia,132 the Seventh Circuit l33 and the
124. Id.
125. Id. at 539-41.
126. Id. at 540 (citing Schiavone v. Fortune, 477 U.S. 21, 30 (1986».
127. Id.
128. Id. at 541.
129. Id. (quoting Rys v. United States Postal Serv., 886 F.2d 443, 447 (1st Cir.
1989».
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. Mondy v. Secretary of Army, 845 F.2d 1051 (D.C. Cir. 1988).
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Eighth Circuit l34 have allowed Title VII plaintiffs to proceed with
their complaints despite untimely service on the proper defendants.
1. Mondy v. Secretary of Army

In Mondy v. Secretary ofArmy, l3S a plaintiff, proceeding in forma
pauperis, once again named the wrong Title VII defendant in his com
plaint. 136 Twenty-five days after receipt of his right-to-sue letter, the
plaintiff filed his "papers" with the appropriate United States District
Court. 137 The district court granted plaintiff Mondy's motion to pro
ceed in forma pauperis and dismissed the case sua sponte. 138 Mondy
then moved to alter the judgment, the district court granted the mo
tion, and service followed. 139 Unfortunately for the plaintiff, this re
sulted in service of the complaint almost four months after the
expiration of the limitations period. l40 The district court dismissed
the complaint as it had not been served upon the proper parties during
the limitations period. 141 The United States Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia reversed, deciding that equitable tolling should
apply.142 Noting that the judicial power to toll should be exercised
"only in extraordinary and carefully circumscribed instances," the
court found that the facts of the case justified tolling due to the. plain
tiff's right to rely on the court to effect timely service as provided by
the in forma pauperis statute. 143 The court also noted that the plaintiff
was diligent in filing the complaint and did not set up a "photo-finish,"
expecting same day service. l44 Accordingly, the court allowed rela
tion back of an amended complaint correcting the name of the
defendant.14s
133. Paulk v. Department of Air Force, 830 F.2d 79 (7th Cir. 1987).
134. Warren v. Department of Army, 867 F.2d 1156 (8th Cir. 1989).
135. 845 F.2d 1051 (D.C. Cir. 1988).
136. Id. at 1052. The plaintiff named his activity commander, rather than the Secre
tary of the Army. Id.
137. Id. The plaintiff received his right-ta-sue letter on September 23, 1985. Id. The
opinion does not state the day the complaint was filed but merely indicates that the plaintiff
"filed his papers with the court ... on October 18, 1985." Id. Presumably these "papers"
were the motion to proceed in forma pauperis with its accompanying statement of the
claim, which could have been deemed by the court to be the complaint. See id. at 1054.
138. Id. at 1053 n.2.
139. Id.
140. Id. at 1054. The United States Attorney was served at this time. Id.
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. Id. at 1057.
144. Id.
145. Id.
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2. Paulk v. Department ofAir Force

In Paulk v. Department ofAir Force, 146 a pro se plaintiff proceed
ing in forma pauperis also named the wrong defendant in a Title VII
action against the federal government. 147 Due to the length of time
taken by the district court in consideration of the in forma pauperis
petition, the United States Attorney was not served with the complaint
for more than one month after it had been filed and the limitations
period had expired. 148 The district court did not allow the plaintiff to
amend her complaint. It dismissed the suit because the proper defend
ant did not receive notice of the suit within the limitations period. 149
The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit re
versed this dismissal. ISO The court initially found that service upon
the United States Attorney was sufficient to afford notice to the proper
defendant, the Secretary of Defense. IS I In making this determination,
the court relied upon the literal language of Rule 15(c), 152 which pro
vides that service upon the United States Attorney or Attorney Gen
eral constitutes sufficient notice to an officer or agency of the federal
government to allow relation back of an amended complaint later
naming that officer or agency as the defendant~ IS3 The court noted
that the Advisory Committee Comments to the 1966 Amendment of
Rule 15(c) "ma[d]e clear" that the purpose of this provision in Rule
15(c) "was intended for precisely the situation in the present case."IS4
More speCifically, the court stated that the amendment was designed
"to assist groups, such as Social Security claimants, that were having
difficulties ascertaining the proper governmental defendant."155
The Paulk court then tolled the limitations period, concluding
that "[s]ervice of process on the United States Attorney gave, pursuant
to Rule 15(c), the proper federal governmental defendant notice of the
146.

830 F.2d 79 (7th Cir. 1987).
Id. at 80. The plaintiff named the Department of the Air Force and not Casper
Weinberger, Secretary of Defense. Id. The plaintiff a\leged employment discrimination on
the basis of race. Id. The record in the case was unclear as to whether the plaintiff had
filed her complaint and in forma pauperis petition within thirty days after her receipt of the
right-to-sue letter. Id. at 80 n.l. The district court and the court of appeals both assumed
that the complaint was timely filed. Id.
148. Id. at 82.
149. Id. at 80-81.
ISO. Id. at 83.
151. Id. at 82.
152. FED. R. CIV. P. 15(c). For the text of Rule 15(c), see supra note 48.
153. Paulk, 830 F.2d at 81-82.
154. Id. at 81. For a general discussion of the 1966 amendments, see supra text
accompanying notes SO-57. See also Brussack, supra note 56.
ISS. Paulk, 830 F.2d at 83.
147.

ESCAPING THE J5(c) TRAP

1991]

245

action and of the mistaken naming of the wrong governmental defend
ant."IS6 The court noted that the period of time taken by a district
court in consideration of a motion to proceed in forma pauperis could
consume the entire Title VII thirty-day limitations period. ls7 There
fore, the court decided to toll the limitations period during the pen
dency of such motions to "allow[] 28 U.S.C. § 1915 and Rule 15(c) to
operate harmoniously, instead of denying the benefits of the 1966
Amendment of Rule 15(c) to the very plaintiffs who are most likely to
need

it."IS8

3.

Warren v. Department of Army

In Wa"en v. Department ofArmy, IS9 the United States Court of
Appeals for the Eighth Circuit also allowed tolling of the limitations
period to correct the name of the defendant so as to allow relation
back of an amended complaint. 160 In Wa"en, the plaintiff filed his pro
se complaint with the district court twenty-three days after receipt of
the right-to-sue letter.l 61 On the twenty-fourth day, the plaintiff filed a
motion to proceed in forma pauperis. 162 After a thirty-two day period
for consideration, the district court denied the application.l 63 The
United States Attorney and Attorney General were served sixty-five
days after the limitations period had expired. l64 Relying on ambigu
ous language in the right-to-sue letter and the extreme length of time
taken by the district court in consideration of the in forma pauperis
motion, the court of appeals tolled the limitations period and found
that service on the United States Attorney was sufficient to allow rela
tion back under Rule 15(c).16S The court deemed the complaint to
156. Id. at 82.
157. Id.
158. Id. at 83. The Paulk court also raised the concern of potential problems of
equal protection for in forma pauperis plaintiffs, noting that because the delay in these cases
is "solely within the control of the district court," similar claims would be treated differ
ently with regard to relation back "only on the basis of the speed with which the court
chose to process them." Id. (citing Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co., 455 U.S. 422, 441-42
(1982) (separate opinion of Blackmun, J.); Logan, 455 U.S. at 444 (powell, J., concurring in
judgment».
159. 867 F.2d 1156 (8th Cir. 1989).
160. Id. at 1160. The plaintiff alleged that he was discriminated against because of
his race and sex. Id. at 1157. The complaint improperly named the Department of the
Army rather than the Secretary of Defense. Jd. at 1157-58.
161. Id. at 1157.
162. Id. at 1158.
163. Id. The district court allowed the plaintiff to pay his fees on an installment
basis. Id.
164. Id.
165. Id. at 1160-61.
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have been timely served on the United States Attorney and noted that
the defendant "acted with 'utmost diligence,' only to find himself
caught up in an arcane procedural snare."l66
III.

EsCAPING

THE

lS(c) TRAP

Johnson, Soto, Mondy, Paulk, and Wa"en all demonstrate that
the strict construction given to Rule lS(c) by the United States
Supreme Court in Schiavone may indeed trap an in forma pauperis
plaintiff who has mistakenly named the wrong Title VII defendant.
These cases demonstrate that equitable tolling has been the only po
tential method of escape enabling the plaintiff to pursue the merits of
his or her case. In order to successfully convince a court that the limi
tations period should be tolled, a plaintiff must first maneuver through
several steps before he or she is allowed to present a claim before the
court. These hurdles include an analysis as to whether equitable toll
ing is consistent with the applicable statutes and Rules, Title VII, the
in forma pauperis statute, and the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
The analysis then narrows to focus on whether the plaintiff can
demonstrate all of the following three elements: active deception or
misrepresentation toward the plaintiff by the defendant, the court or
the administrative agency which conducted the initial investigation;
reliance by the plaintiff upon the court or its officers to effect proper
service; and, diligence by the plaintiff in pursuit of the claim.
This Section discusses generally the doctrine of equitable tolling
and outlines the obstacles a plaintiff must overcome. The Section then
discusses the doctrine of equitable tolling as it specifically applies to
the Title VII, in forma pauperis plaintiff, using the facts presented in
Johnson, Soto, Mondy, Paulk, and Wa"en. 167
166. Id. at 1160 (quoting Martinez v. Orr, 738 F.2d 1107, 1112 (10th Cir. 1984».
The Warren court also relied upon the identity-of-interest between "the Department of the
Army and its Secretary." Id. at 1161. The court concluded that notice of the action could
be imputed from the Department to the Secretary, thereby satisfying the third factor of the
Schiavone four-part relation back test. Id. at 1160-61; see Schiavone v. Fortune, 477 U.S.
21, 29 (1986) (The party to be added "must or should have known that, but for a mistake
concerning identity, the action would have been brought against it."). For a discussion of
the tests for relation back under Rule 15(c), see supra text accompanying notes 58-74. The
Warren court stated that it "ha[d] little doubt but that the same individual would have
received Warren's suit papers regardless of whether the Department or its Secretary were
named as defendant." Warren, 867 F.2d at 1160-61.
167. This analysis concentrates on the narrow factual situation of the in forma
pauperis plaintiff and does not specifically address cases where the plaintiff, while pro se,
has not attempted to proceed in forma pauperis. The reason for this distinction is that a
plaintiff who is proceeding in forma pauperis will rely more heavily upon the court and its
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The Doctrine of Equitable Tolling of the Limitations Period

The United States Supreme Court's strict interpretation of Rule
lS(c) in Schiavone results in the dismissal of potentially meritorious
claims when a Title VII plaintiff suing the federal government has
named the wrong defendant during the limitations period and later
attempts to correct the error through amendment. This result may be
unduly harsh, especially where the plaintiff is proceeding pro se and in
light of the remedial nature of anti-discrimination legislation. Some
courts have responded by equitably tolling the limitations period.
Tolling is the method used by the courts to artificially stop the running
of time as it applies to a statute of limitations. 168 Hence, tolling the
limitations period allows the plaintiff to meet the fourth requirement
of the Schiavone test, that the correct defendant receive notice of the
action within the limitations period. 169 Principles of equity are used to
toll a statute of limitations period when notions of fairness and justice
so require. 170 The question as to whether a limitations period will be
tolled generally arises when a defendant has not received proper notice
of the action before the expiration of the statute of limitations.
The Supreme Court has suggested that courts may toll a Title VII
limitations period where:
[A] claimant has received inadequate notice ... where a motion for
appointment of counsel is pending and equity would justify tolling
the statutory period until the motion is acted upon ... , where the
court has led the plaintiff to believe that she had done everything
required of her ... [or] where affirmative misconduct on the part of
a defendant lulled the plaintiff into inaction. 171
processes than a plaintiff who is not. See infra notes 265-73 and accompanying text for a
discussion of the reliance issue.
168. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1448 (6th ed. 1990). One commentator has sug
gested that courts may be willing to toll statutes of limitation because these time periods are
arbitrarily drawn by the legislature. Fischer, The Limits ofStatutes of Limitation, 16 Sw.
U.L. REv. I, 3 (1986).
169. Schiavone, 477 U.S. at 29; see supra text accompanying notes 58-74.
170. See Baldwin County Welcome Center v. Brown, 466 U.S. 147 (1984) (per
curiam); Zipes v. Trans World Airlines, 455 U.S. 385 (1982); Warren v. Department of
Army, 867 F.2d 1156 (8th Cir. 1989); Mondy v. Secretary of Army, 845 F.2d 1051 (D.C.
Cir. 1988); Paulk v. Department of Air Force, 830 F.2d 79 (7th Cir. 1987); Harris v. Wal
green's Distribution Center, 456 F.2d 588 (6th Cir. 1972); Mohler v. Miller, 235 F.2d 153
(6th Cir. 1956).
171. Baldwin County, 466 U.S. at 151 (citing Carlile v. South Routt School Dist. RE
3-1, 652 F.2d 981 (10th Cir. 1981); Villasenor v. Lockheed Aircraft Corp., 640 F.2d 207
(9th Cir. 1981); Wilkerson v. Siegfried Ins. Agency, Inc., 621 F.2d 1042 (10th Cir. 1980);
Leake v. University of Cincinnati, 605 F.2d 255 (6th Cir. 1979); Gates v. Georgia-Pacific
Corp., 492 F.2d 292 (9th Cir. 1974); Harris v. Walgreen's Distribution Center, 456 F.2d
588 (6th Cir. 1972» (The Court discussed these general notions of tolling in dicta.). Several
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In Burnett v. New York Central Railroad CO.,I72 the Supreme
Court indicated that in order to determine whether a limitations pe
riod may be tolled, a court must first look to the "legislative intent [as
to] whether the right shall be enforceable . . . after the prescribed
time." 173 Determination of the congressional intent requires an exam
ination of "the purposes and policies underlying the limitation provi
sion, the Act itself, and the remedial scheme developed for the
enforcement of the rights given by the Act."174
The general purpose of a statute of limitations is to "assure fair
ness to defendants."17s A limitations period is:
designed to promote justice by preventing surprises through the re
vival of claims that have been allowed to slumber until evidence has
been lost, memories have faded, and witnesses have disappeared.
The theory is that even if one has a just claim it is unjust not to put
the adversary on notice to defend within the period of limitation
and that the right to be free of stale claims in time comes to prevail
over the right to prosecute them. 176

Several courts have ruled that this "policy of repose"177 is outweighed
where equitable considerations and the "interests of justice require
vindication of the plaintiff's rights!'178 However, as noted by one
court, "[t]he tolling exception is not an open-ended invitation to the
courts to disregard limitations periods simply because they bar what
may be an otherwise meritorious cause. [Courts] may not ignore the
legislative intent to grant the defendant a period of repose after the
courts have relied on the Supreme Court's language in Baldwin to toll a limitations period.
See Warren, 867 F.2d 1156; Mondy, 845 F.2d 1051; Paulk, 830 F.2d 79; Martinez v. Orr,
738 F.2d 1107 (10th Cir. 1984).
172. 380 U.S. 424 (1965).
173. Id. at 426 (quoting Midstate Horticultural Co. v. Pennsylvania R.R., 320 U.S.
356,360 (1943». Burnett involved tolling of the limitations period under the Federal Em
ployer's Liability Act ("FELA"), 45 U.S.C. § 51 (1958). Id. at 424. The Court referred to
the congressional purpose in enacting FELA as "humane and remedial." Id. at 427.
174. Id. at 427.
175. Id. at 428.
176. American Pipe & Constr. Co. v. Utah, 414 U.S. 538, 554 (1974) (quoting Order
ofR.R. Telegraphers v. Railway Express Agency, 321 U.S. 342,348-49 (1944»; see also 6A
C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & M. KANE, supra note 18, § 1502, at 164-65 ("[T)he purpose of
requiring actions seeking judicial relief to be filed within a prescribed statutory period and
in a certain manner [i]s to insure that an appropriate official or agency of the government
receive[s] timely notice of the claim.").
177. Burnett, 380 U.S. at 428.
178. Id. See Board of Regents v. Tomanio, 446 U.S. 478, 482 (1980); American Pipe,
414 U.S. at 554; Whittaker v. Whittaker Corp., 639 F.2d 516 (9th Cir.), cert denied, 454
U.S. 1031 (1981).
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limitations period has expired."179 With regard to Title VII time lim
its, the judiciary has been hesitant to equitably modify the legislative
pronouncement except in the most narrow of factual circumstances. 180
Although not central to the issue of whether the period for service
of a complaint may be tolled to accord proper notice under Rule 15(c),
another critical question in many tolling cases is the determination of
when the action actually began. 181 The Federal Rules of Civil Proce
dure provide that an action "is commenced by filing a complaint with
the court." 182 In several cases which discuss the application of equita
ble tolling, the plaintiff had failed to file the action prior to the expira
tion of a limitations period. 183 Factors used by courts to consider the
application of tolling in these cases include: whether or not the plain
tiff was represented by counsel;l84 whether the plaintiff had been in
some way "prevented" from asserting her rights;18S whether the de
fendant has "actively misled the plaintiff respecting the cause of ac
tion"; 186 whether a court or a state or federal agency has "lulled" the
plaintiff into inaction; 187 whether the plaintiff has acted diligently; 188
and whether the plaintiff's conduct demonstrated an intention to pro
179. School Dist. v. Marshall, 657 F.2d 16, 20 (3d Cir. 1981); see also Mondy v.
Secretary of Army, 845 F.2d 1051, 1057 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (courts' power to exercise equita
ble tolling should be used "only in extraordinary and carefully circumscribed instances");
Smith v. American President Lines, 571 F.2d 102, 109 (2d Cir. 1978) (tolling of Title VII
time limits "may be very restricted").
180. See Irwin v. Veterans Admin., 111 S. Ct. 453, 458 (1990) ("Federal courts have
typically extended equitable relief only sparingly."); Rys v. United States Postal Serv., 886
F.2d 443, 446 (1st Cir. 1989) (citing Mack v. Great Atl. and Pac. Tea Co., 871 F.2d 179,
185 (1st Cir. 1989» (equitable exceptions to Title VII limitations periods are to be viewed
narrowly); Kocian v. Getty Ref. & Mktg. Co., 707 F.2d 748, 753 (3d Cir. 1983) (equitable
tolling of Title VII time limits allowed only in "extraordinary circumstances"), cert. de
nied, 464 U.S. 852 (1983); Smith, 571 F.2d at III (case must present "unusual circum
stances" to invoke tolling).
181. Mohler v. Miller, 235 F.2d 153, 155 (6th Cir. 1956).
182. FED. R. av. P. 3.
183. See International Union of Elec., Radio & Mach. Workers, Loca1 790 v. Rob
bins & Myers, Inc., 429 U.S. 229, 237-40 (1976) (no tolling where plaintiff filed grievance
through collective bargaining agreement rather than timely filing of a civil case); Kocian v.
Getty Ref. & Mktg. Co., 707 F.2d 748, 753 (3d Cir.) (no tolling where plaintiff "never filed
a timely claim in any forum"), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 852 (1983); Smith, 571 F.ld at 105,
109 (no tolling where claim was not timely filed).
184. Irwin, 111 S. Ct. at 458.
185. Robbins & Myers, 429 U.S. at 237 n.1O (1976) (quoting Burnett v. New York
Cent. R.R., 380 U.S. 424, 429 (1965».
186. Smith, 571 F.2d at 109.
187. Carlile v. South Routt School Dist. RE 3-1,652 F.2d 981, 986 (10th Cir. 1981).
188. Baldwin County Welcome Center v. Brown, 466 U.S. 147, 151 (1984) ("One
who fails to act diligently cannot invoke equitable principles to excuse that lack of
diligence. ").
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ceed with the action. 189

B.

The General Inquiries-Is'Equitable Tolling Consistent With the
Applicable Statutes and Rules?
1.

Title VII

A review of several cases in the general area of equitable tolling
suggests a multi-step analysis to determine the compatibility of the
statute in question with the application of tolling. 190
The first step in the tolling analysis requires an examination of
the statute and its legislative history to determine the legislative intent
specifically with regard to tolling. The court must decide "whether
. . . in a given context [tolling] is consonant with the legislative
scheme,"191 or whether the "congressional purpose is effectuated by
tolling the statute of limitations in given circumstances."192
In Whittaker v. Whittaker Corp., 193 a case involving securities law
violations, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
outlined the steps to be taken in determining whether tolling is "con
sonant with the legislative scheme."194 The first step proposed by the
court in Whittaker is to look at the "bare words of the time provi
sion."19S If the statute is silent with regard to tolling, the court must
then examine the legislative history.196 If the legislative history is si
lent, then the court should consider the congressional intent of the
statute as a whole considering "the place of the time provision in that
overall legislative scheme."197
Applying this analysis to Title VII, the "bare words"198 of Title
VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16(c), lend little insight into the purpose of the
thirty-day limitations period. The 1972 limitations provision merely
instructs the plaintiff to file a civil action within thirty days of receipt
of the right-to-sue letter. 199 It does not indicate why a limitations pe
189. Mohler v. Miller, 235 F.2d 153, 155 (6th Cir. 1956).
190. See American Pipe & Constr. Co. v. Utah, 414 U.S. 538, 556-59 (1974); Whitta
ker v. Whittaker Corp., 639 F.2d 516, 527 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1031 (1981).
191. American Pipe, 414 U.S. at 558.
192. Burnett V. New York Cent. R.R., 380 U.S. 424, 427 (1965).
193. 639 F.2d 516 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1031 (1981) (construction of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78(P), insider short-swing trading
provisions).
194. American Pipe, 414 U.S. at 558.
195. Whittaker, 639 F.2d at 527.
196. ·Id. at 528.
197. Id.
198. Id. at 527.
199. See supra note 22 for the text of this statutory time limit.
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riod is required or why a thirty-day period was chosen. 200 The statute
is also silent regarding the specific issue of tolling. 201
Similarly, at the second step of the analysis, the legislative history
of the original Title VII limitations period regarding private party de
fendants is not helpful in discerning the intent of Congress. The legis
lative rationale behind the original limitations period of Title VII is
"sparse" but its purpose was described "as preventing the pressing of
'stale' c1aims."202 Presumably, the purpose of the limitations period
was similar to that of most statutes of limitations, to afford a period of
repose to potential defendants.203
The statute and its legislative history do not provide sufficient
guidance regarding the potential application of equitable tolling.
Therefore, the analysis falls to the third step outlined in Whittaker. 204
Like the limitations period in Whittaker, the Title VII time limit for
suit by individuals against the federal government is "made a part of
the section itself rather than incorporated by reference to another pro
vision."20s Accordingly, the provision must be construed as part of
the overa11 legislative scheme.206
In Zipes v. Trans World Airlines,207 the United States Supreme
Court addressed the legislative scheme of Title VII and the application
of waiver, estoppel and equitable tolling to Title VII suits against pri
vate sector defendants. The Court found that timely filing of such Ti
200. See SUBCOMM. ON LABOR OF THE SENATE CoMM. ON LABOR ANO PUBLIC
WELFARE, 920 CoNG., 20 SESS., LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE EQUAL EMPLOYMENT
OPPORTUNITY Acr OF 1972 (H.R. 1746, P.L. 92-261) AMENDING TITLE VII OF THE
CIvIL RIGHTS Acr OF 1964 (Comm. Print 1972) [hereinafter SUBCOMM. ON LABOR].
201. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-I6(c) (1988).
202. Zipes v. Trans World Airlines, 455 U.S. 385, 394 (1982) (citing statement of
Sen. Case, 110 CoNG. REc. 7243 (1964».
203. See supra notes 175-77 and accompanying text.
204. Whittaker, 639 F.2d at 528.
205. Id. In Whittaker, the time limit was provided by the insider trading provisions
ofthe Securities Exchange Act of 1934, IS U.S.C. § 78 (1971). Id. at 518-19. In Title VII,
the thirty-day limitations provision is part of the overall statutory section encompassing
employment by the federal government. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16 (1988).
206. American Pipe & Constr. Co. v. Utah, 414 U.S. 538, 558 (1974); Burnett v.
New York Cent. R.R., 380 U.S. 424,426 (1965) (citing Midstate Horticultural Co. v. Penn
sylvania R.R., 320 U.S. 356, 360 (1943»; Whittaker, 639 F.2d at 527-28.
As suggested by the United States Supreme Court in American Pipe, a court must also
answer the question of whether the judiciary has the power to toll statutes of limitation and
to apply its interpretation of a particular legislative scheme. 414 U.S. at 558; see also Zipes
v. Trans World Airlines, 455 U.S. 385, 394 (1982); Burnett, 380 U.S. at 426-27. In Ameri
can Pipe, the Supreme Court answered this question affirmatively, and employed tolling
regardless of whether the time limitations are procedural or substantive. 414 U.S. at 558
59.
207. 455 U.S. 385 (1982).
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tle VII claims was not a jurisdictional prerequisite to suit, but rather,
like a statute of limitations, it was subject to principles of equity.20S
Exercising its discretion, the Court specifically relied on "[t]he struc
ture of Title VII [and] the congressional policy underlying it."209
Based upon the language in the time provision which was silent as to
the jurisdiction of the courts, the Court found that the time for filing
suit was in the nature of a statute of limitations, rather than a jurisdic
tional prerequisite. 210
In Zipes, the Court also restated its position regarding the "guid
ing principle for construing the provisions of Title VII."211 Citing an
earlier Title VII case, the Court noted that "a technical reading [of the
statute] would be 'particularly inappropriate in a statutory scheme in
which laymen, unassisted by trained lawyers, initiate the process.' "212
The Supreme Court further stated that holding the time limits of
Title VII subject to tolling "when equity so requires ... honor[s] the
remedial purpose of the legislation as a whole without negating the
particular purpose of the filing requirement, to give prompt notice to
the employer."213 Other courts have also noted the "remedial and hu
manitarian underpinnings of Title VII."214
In Irwin v. Veterans Administration,21s the Supreme Court ex
tended the Zipes rationale to Title VII suits against the federal govern
ment.2 16 In Irwin, the plaintiff alleged that he had been unlawfully
discharged from his position with the Veteran's Administration be
cause of his race and physical disability.217 The EEOC dismissed Ir
win's complaint and mailed a right-to-sue letter to both the plaintiff
and his attorney. The attorney's office received the letter on March
23, while the attorney was out of the country.21S "The attorney did
not learn ofthe EEOC's action until his return on April 10."219 Plain
Id. at 393.
209. Id.
210. Id. at 394. The applicable statutory section designating the time limits for Title
VII suit against a private party defendant is 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5 (1988). The statute of
limitations section for suit against a federal government defendant specifically incorporates
the section for suing private defendants. 42 U.S.c. § 2000e-I6(c) (1988).
211. Zipes, 455 U.S. at 397.
212. Id. (citing Love v. Pullman Co., 404 U.S. 522, 527 (1972».
213. Id. at 398.
214. Harris v. Walgreen's Distribution Center, 456 F.2d 588, 591 (6th Cir. 1972)
(quoting Sanchez v. Standard Brands, Inc., 431 F.2d 455, 460-61 (5th Cir. 1970».
215. 111 S. O. 453 (1990).
216. Id. at 457.
217. Id. at 455.
218. Id.
219. Id.
208.

ESCAPING THE J5(c) TRAP

1991]

253

tiff Irwin's Title VII complaint was filed on May 6. 220 The Supreme
Court upheld the court of appeals and found that the complaint was
untimely as it had been filed forty-four days after the attorney's office
received the right-to-sue letter.221
In an effort to save the complaint, the plaintiff argued that the
doctrine of equitable tolling could be applied in Title VII suits against
the federal government, and that the limitations period should be
tolled in this case. 222 The Court accepted the plaintiff's contention
that equitable tolling applied to suits against the federal government,
thereby extending the Zipes rationale to these cases. 223 The Court
found that since Congress had waived the sovereign immunity of the
United States by allowing a civil action under Title VII, permitting the
application of tolling did "little, if any, [to] broad[en] ... the congres
sional waiver. "224 The Court held "that the same rebuttable presump
tion of equitable tolling applicable to suits against the private
defendants ... also appl[ies] to suits against the United States."22S
The Court then refused to toll the limitations period on behalf of the
plaintiff, finding that the evidence did not reveal cause for application
of tolling.226
2.

The. In Forma Pauperis Statute

In the factual scenario of a Title VII, in forma pauperis plaintiff
suing the federal government, the analysis cannot be limited to Title
VII but must also consider the federal in forma pauperis statute. 227
The overall legislative purpose of the in forma pauperis statute should
be read in connection With Title VII when considering the application
of equitable tolling in step three of the Whittaker analysis, examina
tion of the congressional intent in enacting the statute as a whole. 228
The legislative purpose for enactment of the in forma pauperis
220. Id.

221. id. at 456. The Court found that receipt by the office was equivalent to receipt
by the attorney and that "[u]nder our system ·of representative litigation, 'each party is
deemed bound by the acts of his lawyer-agent and is considered to have 'notice of all facts,
notice of which can be charged upon the attorney.' '" Id. (quoting Link v. Wabash R.R.,
370 U.S. 626, 634 (1962) (quoting Smith v. Ayer, 101 U.S. 320, 326 (1880»).

222.
223.
224.
225.
226.

Id.
Id. at 457.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 458. The Court found that the plaintiff's failure to file in a timely manner

as a result of his attorney's absence was at most "excusable neglect" and not an instance
which warranted tolling. Id.
227. 28 U.S.C. § 1915 (1988).
228. See supra note 197 and accompanying text.

WESTERN NEWENGLAND LAW REVIEW

254

[Vol. 13:225

statute is similar to the remedial goals of Title VII. "Congress enacted
the in forma pauperis statute to 'open the United States courts to a
class of citizens who have rights to be adjudicated,' but who are too
poor to pay the filing fees and court costs. "229 The statute ensures
equal access to the federal courts and the opportunity for all individu
als to litigate the merits of their legitimate claims without regard to
wealth.230
3.

The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure

The final question in considering whether tolling is appropriate in
the case of the Title VII, pro se, in forma pauperis plaintiff who mis
names the defendant involves the applicable Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure. Unfortunately, the Rules provide little guidance regarding
the tolling issue as they may be read both to favor and disfavor the
equitable tolling exception to the statute of limitations.
The "barewords"231 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure may
be interpreted to allow equitable tolling and the adjudication of the
merits of a claim or to disfavor tolling and prohibit the plaintiff from
continuing. Rule 1, which applies to construction of the rest of the
Rules, notes that the Rules should be applied so as to "secure the just,
speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action."232 Rule 8(f)
states that "[a]ll pleadings shall be so construed as to do substantial
justice."233 On one hand, the justice requirements of the Rules favor
tolling because tolling affords the plaintiff the chance to adjudicate his
or her claim. On the other hand, "justice" may be read through the
eyes of the defendant to disfavor tolling. The necessity for "speedy
and inexpensive" resolution of cases would also preclude tolling as it
necessarily delays a proceeding beyond the specified statute of limita
tions. The literal language of Rule IS(c) does not appear to provide
any insight as to whether tolling should be allowed to permit relation
229. Note, supra note 32, at 746 (quoting H.R. REp. No. 1097, 52d Cong. 1st Sess. 1
(1892».
230. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915 (1988). The "statute is intended to guarantee that no
citizen shall be denied an opportunity to commence, prosecute, or defend an action, civil or
criminal, 'in any court of the United States' solely because his poverty makes it impossible
for him to payor secure the costs." Adkins v. E.!. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 335 U.S.
331, 342 (1948) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 832(1), which was the original codification of 28
U.S.C. § 1915(a».
231. Whittaker v. Whittaker Corp., 639 F.2d 516, 527 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 454
U.S. 1031 (1981).
232. FED. R. CIV. P. 1.
233. FED. R. CIV. P. 8(f).
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back. 234 The Rule does not mention any remedial purpose for equity
nor does it state any language which could be read to permit tolling.
It does state that in order to allow relation back, the defendant should
have received such notice so as not to be prejudiced. 235 This require
ment is basic to any decision to allow tolling. 236
In addition to the actual language of the Rules, the Advisory
Committee's Notes accompanying the amendments to the Rules pro
vide guidance as to the intent behind their enactment. 237 Similar to
Title VII and the in forma pauperis statute, the Advisory Committee's
Notes to the 1966 amendments to Rule IS(c) reflect a remedial con
cern in that they emphasize, similar to the Title VII decisions dis
cussed above, that Rule IS(c)'s purpose was to guarantee a hearing on
the merits of a case rather than to impose a strict technical approach
to pleadings. 238 This is especially true where the defendant is a federal
government agency head and, due to the complexity of the federal
government, his or her name is difficult to ascertain. 239 This is pre
cisely the situation addressed by the Advisory Committee's Notes to
the amendment.24O
In defining the limits of Rule IS(c), the United States Supreme
Court has not ruled against the use of tolling to allow relation back.
In Schiavone, the Supreme Court specifically noted that the district
court had "ruled that the 'equities of this situation' did not demand
that relief be afforded to petitioners."241
A brief review of how Schiavone is distinguished from the case of
the Title VII, pro se, in forma pauperis plaintiff illustrates the limita
tions of the Court's decision and why it does not preclude equitable
tolling. In Schiavone, the plaintiff was represented by counsel, and
was not reliant upon the court to effect service. 242 The limitations pe
riod in Schiavone was one year. 243 This Contrasts sharply with the
234. For the text of Rule 15(c), see supra note 48.
235. FED. R. CIv. P. 15(c).
236. Baldwin County Welcome Center v. Brown, 466 U.S. 147, 151 (1984) (per
curiam).
237. Schiavone v. Fortune, 477 U.S. 21, 31 (1986) ("Although the Advisory Com
mittee's comments do not foreclose judicial consideration of the Rule's validity, and mean
ing, the construction given by the Committee is 'of weight.' .. (citing Mississippi Publishing
Corp. v. Murphree, 326 U.S. 438, 444 (1946))).
238. 6A C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & M. KANE, supra note 18, § 1502, at 165 n.l0.

239. Id.
240. FED. R. CIV. P. 15(c) advisory committee's note; see supra text accompanying
notes 50-57.
241. Schiavone, 477 U.S. at 24-25 (citing Supp. App. to Pet. for Cert. at 24a).
242. Id. at 23.

243. Id.
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relatively short thirty-day limitations period of Title VII. In Schia
vone, there was no administrative proceeding prior to the filing of the
lawsuit which might have misled the plaintiff into a belief that Fortune
was the proper defendant. 244 These differences between Schiavone and
cases similar to Johnson, Soto, Mondy, Paulk, and Warren, and the
Court's specific notation in Schiavone that equity could not aid the
plaintiffs, suggests that the Court might not disallow tolling in the Ti
tle VII cases.

c.

The Specific Inquiries-Is Equitable Tolling Consistent With the
Facts?

If application of the doctrine of equitable tolling is consistent with
the applicable statutes and rules, the next logical step in the analysis is
to examine the specific factual circumstances of the pending case to
determine if tolling is appropriate. 24S This determination should be
based on three areas of inquiry: the presence or absence of any active
deception or misrepresentation suffered by the plaintiff; the plaintiff's
reliance on the court, its officers or communications from an in
vestigative agency;246 and the plaintiff's diligence or lack of diligence
in pursuit of the claim. 247 These different inquiries are inextricably
related. For example, a plaintiff's reliance may be the result of
misrepresentation,248 or a plaintiff's diligence may lead to his or her
reliance. 249 This Section will present a basic explanation of these fac
tual inquiries and show how they are related by analyzing the
facts m the Johnson,2so Soto,2S1 Mondy,2S2 Paulk,2s3 and
244. See supra note 21 and accompanying text.
245. See Baldwin Coll!lty Welcome Center v. Brown, 466 U.S. 147 (1984) (per
curiam); Rys v. United States Postal Serv., 886 F.2d 443 (1st Cir. 1989); Johnson v. United
States Postal Serv., 861 F.2d 1475 (10th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 54 (1989);
Mondy V. Secretary of Army, 845 F.2d 1051 (D.C. Cir. 1988); Paulk V. Department of Air
Force, 830 F.2d 79 (7th Cir. 1987); GonZalez-Aller Balseyro V. GTE Lenkurt, Inc., 702
F.2d 857 (10th Cir. 1983); Harris v. Walgreen's Distribution Center, 456 F.2d 588 (6th Cir.
1972); Mohler V. Miller, 235 F.2d 153 (6th Cir. 1956).
246. The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission is an example of such an
agency. See supra note 21.
247. Irwin v. Veterans Admin., III S. Ct. 453 (1990).
248. See Rys V. United States Postal Serv., 886 F.2d 443, 446 (1st Cir. 1989) (plaintiff
alleged that he relied upon a misleading right-to-sue letter).
249. See Johnson V. United States Postal Serv., 861 F.2d 1475, 1486-87 (10th Cir.
1988) (McKay, J., dissenting) (plaintiff alleged to have complied with time requirements of
statute and therefore, was entitled to rely upon the court to effect service), cert. denied, 110
S. Ct. 54 (1989).
250. /d.
251. Soto V. United States Postal Serv., 905 F.2d 537 (1st Cir. 1990), cert. denied,
III S. Ct. 679 (1991).

ESCAPING THE J5(c) TRAP

1991]

257

Wa"en 2S4 decisions.
1. Active Deception or Misrepresentation
The fact-based tolling analysis typical1y begins with the question
of whether the plaintiff was somehow misled into naming the wrong
defendant or into filing after the expiration of the limitations period. 2ss
. If the plaintiff was misled or the court, its officers, a federal agency or
the defendant somehow actively deceived the plaintiff into his or her
mistake, then tolling of the limitations period will often be allowed in
order to correct the error. 2S6 Active deception also includes those
cases where the plaintiff was "lulled into inaction" or was. "in some
extraordinary way [] prevented from asserting his or her rights. "2S7
Examples of active deception in the area of Title VII include those
cases where the right-to-sue letter from the EEOC confused the plain
tiff as to who should be named as the defendant2S8 or where the dis
trict court informed the plaintiff that filing of the right-to-sue letter
would toll the limitations period until the plaintiff had obtained coun
sel. 2S9 Hence, active deception includes both those cases where a party
may have purposefully misled a plaintiff, and those cases where the
deception was unintentional. The underlying rationale for al10wing
tolling in these cases is that refusal to allow the plaintiff an opportu
nity to adjudicate his or her claim would be unfair.
In Johnson, the majority argued that the statute of limitations pe
riod could only be tolled based on active deception where the evidence
revealed some "false representation by [a] court, agency, or putative
defendant."260 Similarly, in Solo, the court stated that there must be
an "affirmative showing" of inequity to al10w tolling. 261
252. Mondy v. Secretary of Army, 845 F.2d 1051 (D.C. Cir. 1988).
253. Paulk v. Department of Air Force, 830 F.2d 79 (7th CiT. 1987).
254. Warren v. Department of Army, 867 F.2d 1156 (8th CiT. 1989).
255. Baldwin County Welcome Center v. Brown, 466 U.S. 147 (1984) (per curiam);
Rys v. United States Postal Serv., 886 F.2d 443 (1st CiT. 1989); Johnson v. United States
Postal Serv., 861 F.2d 1475 (10th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 54 (1989); Martinez v.
Orr, 738 F.2d 1107 (10th CiT. 1984); Gonzalez-Aller Balseyro v. GTE Lenkurt, Inc., 702
F.2d 857 (10th CiT. 1983).
256. See cases cited supra note 255.
257. Johnson, 861 F.2d at 1481 (quoting Martinez, 738 F.2d at 1110 (quoting Carlile
v. South Routt School Dist. RE 3-J, 652 F.2d 981, 986 (10th CiT. 1981); Wilkerson v.
Siegfried Ins. Agency, Inc., 683 F.2d 344, 348 (10th Cir. 1982»).
258. Rys, 886 F.2d at 446-47; Warren v. Department of Army, 867 F.2d 1156, 1160
(8th Cir. 1989); Martinez, 738 F.2d at 1110-11.
259. Gonzalez-Aller Balseyro, 702 F.2d at 859.
260. Johnson, 861 F.2d at 1481.
261. Soto v. United States Postal Serv., 905 F.2d 537, 541 (1st Cir. 1990) (citing
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In contrast, the Johnson dissent argued that a plaintiff who had
filed a complaint almost immediately after receiving the right-to-sue
letter "could be completely out of court even though the Marshal pro
ceeded within the [120-day] time limit permitted by [Rule] 4(j)."262
The dissent further argued that this outcome was the equivalent of an
active deception because the plaintiff was denied the opportunity to
litigate his or her claim. 263 The conclusion by the Johnson dissent that
the 120-day time limit allowed for service works a deception on the
plaintiff was linked to the issue of reliance. The plaintiff was forced to
rely on the procedures set out by statute. Accordingly, reliance is the
next issue to be addressed.
2.

Reliance

The issue of reliance is particularly important in the case of a pro
se, in forma pauperis plaintiff because of the individual's lack of legal
expertise in dealing with the complicated procedural maze of Title VII
and the in forma pauperis statute. The reliance issue relates to active
deception because a misrepresentation by a court may lead to reliance
by a plaintiff. For example, a plaintiff may delay service based upon
the statement of a court that filing a right-to-sue letter tolls the statute
of limitations. 264
An individual attempting to proceed in forma pauperis is also
forced into a position of reliance upon the court. Once the individual
has filed the motion he or she is dependent upon the court to consider
the motion within the statute of limitations and, if the motion is
granted, to effect timely service upon the defendant. 26s The Warren,
Mondy, and Paulk courts all permitted equitable tolling of the statute
of limitations precisely because the plaintiffs were forced to rely upon
the court and its processes. 266 In Mondy, the court allowed tolling
because the in forma pauperis plaintiff "lawfully relied upon the mar
shal's office to effect service."267 In Warren and Paulk, tolling was
Baldwin County Welcome Center v. Brown, 466 U.S. 147, 151-52 (1984) (per curiam»,
cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 679 (1991).
262. Johnson, 861 F.2d at 1486 n.lO (McKay, J., dissenting).
263. Id.
264. Gonzalez-Aller Balseyro v. GTE Lenkurt, Inc., 702 F.2d 857, 859 (10th Cir.
1983); see also Rys v. United States Postal Serv., 886 F.2d 443, 447 (1st Cir. 1989) (plaintiff
alleged he relied upon and was misled by right-to-sue letter. Court rejected this argument
noting that plaintiff's actions "belie[d] his alleged reliance" on the letter).
265. 28 U.S.C. § 1915 (1988). See supra note 32 for the text of the statut~.
266. For a discussion of the facts in these cases, see supra notes 135-66 and accompa
nying text.
267. Mondy v. Secretary of Army, 845 F.2d 1051, 1053, 1057 (D.C. Cir. 1988).
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allowed for the time period in which each court considered the motion
to proceed in forma pauperis because this time period essentially
shortened the already short Title VII limitations period. 268
The decisions in Wa"en, Mondy, and Paulk all parallel the dis
sent in Johnson, which was also based primarily upon the plaintiff's
reliance on the court and its processes. The dissent argued that the
plaintiff was "lulled into inaction" (or actively deceived)269 by the
court order granting the in forma pauperis motion which allowed him
to rely on the court and its officers (the Marshal's service) to effect
proper service. 270 The dissent emphasized that the process itself could
lead a party to rely and that reliance need not only be fostered by an
explicit statement or deception. 271 The dissent also noted that the ex
plicit language of the in forma pauperis statute requires that" '[t]he
officers of the court shall issue and serve all process, and perform all
duties' in this type of case."272 This led the dissent to conclude that
officers of the court owe a "special duty" to "unsophisticated
plaintiffs."273
3.

Diligence

Plaintiffs who wish to persuade a court to invoke equitable tolling
sufficient to allow relation back of an amended complaint must act
with diligence in pursuing their claims or face certain dismissal. 274
Therefore, courts will look at a plaintiff's conduct in pursuit of an
action when considering the application of tolling. 275 Although plain
268. Warren v. Department of Army, 867 F.2d 1156, 1160 (8th Cir. 1989); Paulk v.
Department of Air Force, 830 F.2d 79, 83 (7th Cir. 1987); see also Harris v. Walgreen's
Distribution Center, 456 F.2d 588 (6th Cir. 1972) (limitations period tolled during pen
dency of motion for appointment of counsel).
.
Although the Mondy court indicated that the plaintiff's reliance was upon the Mar
shal, the facts revealed that some of the delay was based upon the district court's sua sponte
dismissal of the initial motion. Mondy, 845 F.2d at 1053 n;2.
269. See supra notes 106-16 and accompanying text.
270. Johnson v. United States Postal Serv., 861 F.2d 1475, 1486-87 (10th Cir. 1988)
(McKay, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 54 (1989).
271. Id. at 1487.
272. Id. at 1486 (citing 29 [sic] U.S.C. § 1915(c».

273. Id.
274. Irwin v. Veterans Admin., 111 S. Ct. 453, 458 (1990); Baldwin County Wel
come Center v. Brown, 466 U.S. 147, 151 (1984) (per curiam); Rys v. United States Postal
Serv., 886 F.2d 443, 448 (1st Cir. 1989); see also Schiavone v. Fortune, 477 U.S. 21, 25
(1986) (citing Supp. App. to Pet. for Cert. 25a) (The Court discussed the district court's
ruling that equity should not be used to allow relation back noting that the "petitioners
created [their own] risk by filing their suits close to the end of the limitations period.").
275. Rys, 886 F.2d at 447 (plaintiff did not act with sufficient diligence; no tolling);
Warren v. Department of Army, 867 F.2d 1156, 1160 (8th Cir. 1989) (plaintiff did not
"needlessly delay[]"; tolling allowed); Mondy v. Secretary of Army, 845 F.2d 1051, 1057
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tiffs may not proceed with technical accuracy, courts may consider
certain actions sufficiently diligent to permit tolling. The diligence re
quirement may be satisfied when a plaintiff has attempted timely pur
suit of his or her action, for example, by filing a complaint,276 a right
to-sue letter,277 or a motion to proceed in forma pauperis278 within the
limitations period.
In the Warren, Mondy, and Paulk cases, all of the plaintiffs were
deemed to have been diligent in pursuit of their claims. The dissent in
Johnson argued that there was "no evidence on the record to suggest
undue delay on Mr. Johnson's part."279 The majority disagreed. 28o
While the majority did not refer specifically to the notion of diligence,
it did state that Johnson's complaint was "inadequate," and that the
Marshal was not at fault for delaying service into the 120-day period
allowed by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 40).281 Similarly, in Soto,
the court found that the major flaw in the plaintiff's case for equitable
tolling was his failure to file the action and the motion to proceed in
forma pauperis until the final day of the limitations period. 282
IV.

EQUITABLE TOLLING AS A SOLUTION

Equitable tolling appears to be the only current option available
to Title VII, in forma pauperis plaintiffs who attempt to amend their
pleadings to correct a misnomer in the name of the defendant after the
expiration of the thirty-day statute of limitations period. This Section
discusses the limitations of equitable tolling, arguing that it is not the
best solution to the problem of the misnamed Title VII defendant.
The Section then proposes solutions which would lessen the need for
equitable tolling in these cases.
A. A Critique of Equitable Tolling
The variations presented by Johnson, Soto, Mondy, Paulk, and
(D.C. Cir. 1988) (plaintiff did not expect "same day service"; tolling allowed (quoting Con
forte v. Commissioner, 459 U.S. 1309, 1311 (1983»); Gonzalez-Aller Balseyro v. GTE Len
kurt, Inc., 702 F.2d 857, 859 (10th Cir. 1983) (plaintiff did not sleep on his rights; tolling
allowed).
276. Mondy, 845 F.2d at 1057.
277. Gonzalez-Aller Balseyro, 702 F.2d at 859.
278. Warren, 867 F.2d at 1160.
279. Johnson v. United States Postal Serv., 861 F.2d 1475, 1476 (10th Cir. 1988)
(McKay, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 54 (1989).
280. Id. at 1480.
281. Id.
282. Soto V. United States Postal Serv., 905 F.2d 537, 541 (1st Cir. 1990), cert. de
nied, 111 S. Ct. 679 (1991).
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Wa"en may be viewed as a continuum of factual situations presented
by the Title VII, in forma pauperis plaintiff restricted by Rule lS(c).
At one extreme is the Soto plaintiff who failed to take any action either
by filing a motion to proceed in forma pauperis or by filing a com
plaint.2 83 In Soto, the court was justified in denying the application of
equitable tolling based on any analysis. The Soto plaintiff did not al
low any window in which the court could consider his in forma
pauperis motion. Therefore, he could not be said to have relied on the
court to allow enough time for service of the complaint. The plaintiff
could not have realistically expected a decision on his motion the day
it was filed. Accordingly, he could not argue that the court should
equitably toll the limitations period based on his reliance that the
court would effect timely and appropriate service under the in forma
pauperis statute.
Wa"en, Mondy, and Paulk present the other end of the spec
trum. In Wa"en and Mondy, timely complaints were filed with at
least five days left within the limitations period for the Marshal to
effect service. 284 In Paulk, the court did not note the specific date of
filing, relying on the decision of the district court to assume timeli
ness. 28 !1 In each case, delay caused by the courts or ambiguity in the
right-ta-sue letter made the decision to toll the limitations period rela
tively easy. None of these cases presented the problem of plaintiff dili
gence in light of the short statute of limitations.
Johnson is the factually difficult case which falls somewhere in the
middle of the spectrum. In Johnson, the plaintiff filed his motion to
proceed in forma pauperis five days after receipt of the right-ta-sue
letter.286 The court did not delay in granting the motion, ruling on it
four days later. 287 The problem arose when the plaintiff waited an
other two weeks before filing a pro se complaint on the final day of the
limitations period. 288 Like the plaintiff in Soto, plaintiff Johnson could
not have expected timely service. The crux of the dispute between the
283. Id. at 539. For a discussion of the facts in Soto, see supra notes 117-31 and
accompanying text.
284. Warren v. Department of Army, 867 F.2d 1156, 1157-58 (8th Cir. 1989);
Mondy v. Secretary of Army, 845 F.2d 1051, 1052-53 (D.C. Cir. 1988). For a discussion of
these cases, see supra notes 159-66 & 135-45 and accompanying text.
285. Paulk v. Department of Air Force, 830 F.2d 79, 80 n.l (7th Cir. 1987). See
supra notes 146-58 and accompanying text for a discussion of Paulk.
286. Johnson v. United States Postal Serv., 861 F.2d 1475, 1476 (10th Cir. 1988),
eert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 54 (1989). See supra notes 80-116 and accompanying text for a
discussion of Johnson.
287. Id.
288. Id.
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Johnson majority and the Johnson dissent was whether the plaintiff
had a right to rely on the court to effect timely and proper service
because he had been given the right to proceed in forma pauperis. As
noted by the Johnson dissent, the in forma pauperis statute provides
that the court will effect all service. 289 In fact, the plaintiff proceeding
in forma pauperis has no option but to allow the court to serve the
complaint. 290 The Johnson case presents a conflict between the reli
ance291 and diligence factors of the tolling analysis.
While the bare facts of a case and the plaintiff's actions are gener
ally dispositive of the tolling question, the outcome of a case like John
son is dependent upon the weight given the factors of diligence and
reliance in applying the analysis. The Johnson majority clearly gave
more weight to diligence, whereas, the Johnson dissent found the reli
ance factor more persuasive. As tolling is an equitable measure, it is
somewhat unpredictable which factor will be given more weight by a
particular court. 292 This lack of predictability adds another potential
barrier which may keep the plaintiff from litigating the merits of his or
her claim.
The various steps in the tolling analysis also add the burden of
additional procedure on a legally unsophisticated plaintiff. The path
to court on the merits of a case for a Title VII, in forma pauperis
plaintiff is fraught with technicalities and specific pleading require
ments. The plaintiff must first pursue administrative remedies through
an agency such as the EEOC.293 Within one month after receiving a
right-to-sue letter, the plaintiff must file a motion to proceed in forma
pauperis and a complaint specifically naming the head of the agency or
department as defendant. 294 If a plaintiff fails to name and serve the
proper defendant, the technical requirements for relation back under
Rule 15(c) must be met. If these requirements cannot be completed
because of the lack of timely service to the proper defendant, or other
appropriate parties such as the United States Attorney General, the
plaintiff must then meet the tests of the equitable tolling analysis. Re
. liance on equitable tolling as a method to escape 15(c) can end up as
289. ld. at 1486 (McKay, J., dissenting).
290. 28 U.S.C. § 1915 (1988). For the text of this statute, see supra note 32.
291. For the purposes of this discussion, reliance includes misrepresentation as ar
gued by the dissent in Johnson. See supra text accompanying notes 106-16.
292. For recommendations regarding the balance between reliance and diligence, see
infra notes 308-16 and accompanying text.
293. See supra note 21.
294. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-I6(c) (1988).
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an extension of the quagmire of pleading technicalities. The process
may seem hopelessly difficult, especially to a pro se plaintiff.

B. Proposals for Change
1.

Revise Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(c)

Courts would not be asked to equitably toll the Title VII limita
tions period if Rule 15(c) were amended. Professor Robert Brussack
proposed amending Rule 15(c) to allow relation back if the defendant
received proper notice of the complaint during the period allowed for
"service of the original pleading. "295 The amendment would give the
plaintiff an extra 120 days for service as provided by Rule 4(j), thereby
eliminating the current conflict between the necessity for notice within
a short limitations period, like that of Title VII, and the extended 120
day period for service. 296 In accordance with the second sentence of
Rule 15(c), timely service by the United States Marshal on the Attor
ney General or the United States Attorney would therefore be suffi
cient to allow relation back in these Title VII cases. 297 If Rule 15(c)
were amended as Brussack suggested, the plaintiffs in Johnson and
Soto would have had their day in court and the doctrine of equitable
tolling would not have been at issue.
The premise for Professor Brussack's proposal relies upon the
1966 amendments to Rule 15(c) and the Advisory Committee's reli
ance on cases in which Social Security claimants had mistakenly
named the wrong defendants. 298 Brussack suggested that his proposed
amendment would allow relation back in cases like the Social Security
cases, thereby effectuating the intent of the 1966 Advisory Commit
tee. 299 On a more basic level, Brussack's amendment "would consti
tute a reaffirmation of the principle that pleading mistakes generally
should not be fatal to lawsuits."3°O
Amending Rule 15(c), as Brussack suggested, would eliminate
the need for tolling in Title VII cases where the United States Marshal
properly serves the complaint on behalf of an in forma pauperis plain
295. Brussack, supra note 56, at 687. Other commentators have also suggested
amending Rule 15(c) to achieve the same result. See Epter, supra note 56; Note, Threshold
Requirement, supra note 56; Note, Looking Forward, supra note 56.
296. Brussack, supra note 56, at 688. See supra note 100 for the text of Rule 4(j).
297. Brussack, supra note 56, at 688. See supra note 48 for the text of Rule 15(c).
298. Brussack, supra note 56. See supra notes 50-57 and accompanying text for a
discussion of the 1966 amendments and the Advisory Committee's reliance on the Social
Security cases.
299. Brussack, supra note 56, at 688.
300. Id.
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tiff within the 12O-day period allowed by Rule 4(j). For example, if
the Johnson complaint had been served upon the United States Attor
ney and/or the Attorney General within 120 days, the appropriate
party would have had proper notice within the period allowed for
"service of the original pleading."301 In cases like Johnson and Soto,
where the United States Attorney was not served until after the 120
day period,302 Rule 4(j) would not necessarily require dismissal of the
complaints as the Rule allows a party to "show good cause why such
service was not made within [the] period."303 Hence, the amendment
might also resolve cases like Johnson and Soto.
2.

Extend the Limitations Period of Title VII

Even if Rule IS(c) is amended, Congress should amend Title VII
to extend the thirty-day limitations period for civil action to ninety
days, similar to the time allowed for Title VII plaintiffs suing private
party defendants. 304 The 1972 enactment of a right-to-sue on behalf of
federal employees was intended to give federal employees status equal
to their private sector counterparts in seeking redress from employ
ment discrimination. The legislative history of Title VII reflects this
intention. In support of the legislation, Senator Williams stated:
(W]ritten expressly into the law is a provision enabling an aggrieved
Federal employee to file an action in U.S. District Court for a re
view of the administrative proceeding record after a final order by
his agency or by the Civil Service Commission, if he is dissatisfied
with that decision. Previously, there have been unrealistically high
barriers which prevented or discouraged a Federal employe [sic]
from taking a case to court. This will no longer be the case. There
is no reason why a Federal employee should not have the same private
right of action enjoyed by individuals in the private sector, and I be
lieve that the committee has acted wisely in this regard.
Mr. President, I appreciate the Senate's time and attention. I
am convinced that the language in the committee bill regarding
Federal employees will prove a substantial help to those, who, for so
long, have been "second class citizens, " as far as equal employment
opportunity is concerned. 305
301. [d. at 687.
302. Soto v. United States Postal Serv., 905 F.2d 537, 539 (1st Cir. 1990), cert. de
nied, 111 S. Ct. 679 (1991); Johnson v. United States Postal Serv., 861 F.2d 1475, 1476
(10th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 54 (1989).
303. FED. R. CIV. P. 4(j). For the full text of Rule 4(j), see supra note 100.
304. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f) (1988).
305. 118 CoNG. REC. 4922 (1972), reprinted in SUBCOMM. ON LABOR, supra note
200, at 1727 (emphasis added).
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Extending the limitations period from thirty to ninety days would
accordingly allow a more reasonable amount of time for the plaintiff to
file his or her in forma pauperis motion and complaint. An extension
of the limitatioris period would also afford true equality to federal em
ployees, as Congress originally intended. 306
The extended time is especially important in light of the inexperi
ence of most pro se plaintiffs who file in forma pauperis motions. The
thirty-day limitations period of Title VII barely leaves a plaintiff suffi
cient time to file the in forma pauperis motion and original complaint.
It leaves no buffer for pleading errors such as naming incorrect Title
VII defendants. Extension of the limitations period to ninety days
would provide plaintiffs, like Johnson, who diligently pursue their
claim shortly after receipt of the right-to-sue letter, more time for cor
rection of errors. Extending the limitations period would, therefore,
reduce the number of in forma pauperis plaintiffs seeking equitable
tolling in an effort to correct a misnamed defendant.
.
In the cases which still necessitate application of Rule 15(c), ad
ding sixty days to the Title VII limitations period would reduce the
tension between diligence and reliance in the equitable tolling analysis.
Favoring or weighting diligence over reliance where the statute pro-·
vided a ninety-day limitations period, would be equitable as the plain
tiff would have had sufficient time to complete the myriad of
requirements of the in forma pauperis statute and Title VII. If the
plaintiff were not diligent, denying the application of tolling, which
precludes consideration of the merits, would not appear to be so
harsh. 307
3.

Alternate Recommendations

Without an amendment to Rule 15(c) or to the Title VII limita
tions period, Title VII, in forma pauperis plaintiffs will continue to
seek application of equitable tolling in an effort to amend their com
plaints where they have named the improper Title VII defendant.
Misnomers in these cases are bound to occur due to the probability
that the plaintiff has dealt with the agency as defendant during the
306. See. e.g., Irwin v. Veterans Admin., 874 F.2d 1092, 1094 (5th Cir. 1989) (con
structive notice doctrine of Title VII suits against private employers applicable to suits
against the federal government because there is "no reason to believe Congress intended a
different result in suits against the government than in suits against private employers"),
aff'd, III S. Ct. 453 (1990).
307. See. e.g., Johnson v. United States Postal Serv., 113 F.R.D. 73, 76 (D. Colo.
1986), aff'd, 861 F.2d 1475 (10th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 54 (1989).
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administrative process. 308 When applying the doctrine of tolling,
courts should be reminded of the remedial purpose of the in forma
pauperis statute and Title VII.309 Viewing the cases in this light,
greater weight should be accorded plaintiff reliance on the procedures
of the court rather than on diligence.
The meaning of diligence and determining whether a plaintiff has
been diligent is open to debate. One definition of diligence, "the de
gree of care and caution required by the circumstances of a person,"310
opens the question as to what exactly is required when filing a com
plaint in forma pauperis. In any diligence analysis a court must decide
whether it will require filing on or before the final day of the limita
tions period or whether diligence implies that filing must be made at
some time before the final day. If a court should decide the latter, it
must then decide how many days before the final day of the limitations
period constitutes diligence. The ambiguities in defining diligence sug
gest weighting reliance more heavily, especially when the plaintiff is
prose and in forma pauperis. A layperson reading a statute should be
required to comply only with the literal statutory requirements and
not be expected to read between the lines to satisfy some heightened
standard for the convenience of the court and the Marshal in serving
the complaint. The statute does not say that the in forma pauperis
plaintiff must file a complaint within twenty days, twenty-five days or
some other number less than the thirty-day requirement. Unlike a pro
se plaintiff, the courts and the Marshal are expected to be familiar with
the law and the requirements for proper service.
Reliance should receive special attention when the facts reveal
that the plaintiff has made a good faith attempt to pursue the claim in
a timely manner, as in Johnson. Emphasizing reliance in the tolling
analysis may avoid the harsh result of Schiavone. 311
308. ld. at 77.
309. See supra text accompanying notes 211-14.
310. THE RANDOM HOUSE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 554 (2d ed.
1987).
311. Arguably this result is consistent with Schiavone, noting the factual differences
between the plaintiffs in Schiavone and the Title VII, in forma pauperis plaintiff. In Schia
vone, the plaintiffs were represented by counsel, they had an extended limitations period of
one year and they were not solely dependent upon the court and its officers to effect service.
The Title VII, in forma pauperis plaintiff has only thirty days to file the in forma pauperis
motion and complaint. Finally, the Title VII, in forma pauperis plaintiff is completely
dependent on the court to effect service. As noted in Schiavone, there were no equities
which would have led toward a more lenient position regarding the plaintiff's request to
amend. Schiavone v. Fortune. 477 U.S. 21. 24-25 (1986). In contrast. the reliance of the
Title VII. in forma pauperis plaintiff on the court and its processes indicates a balancing
toward the plaintiff rather than against.
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Prioritizing reliance in the tolling analysis serves to tip the bal
ance of a fair application of Rule IS(c) back toward the plaintiff. One
commentator has suggested that "the literal interpretation of [R]ule
15(c) creates a double standard under which a relation-back defendant
possesses more rights than the original defendant."312 Since Rule 40)
allows service of the complaint 120 days after filing,313 a properly
named defendant may receive notice of the suit after expiration of the
limitations period. 314 However, in cases of misnomer:
[After] Schiavone, a relation-back defendant must receive notice
prior to the running of the statute of limitations. Thus, the added
defendant not only benefits from a more stringent notice require
ment than the original defendant, but also receives more rights than
the law would provide had the original complaint designated the
relation-back defendant as the proper party in the first instance. 31s

Logically, the presumption should be that in enacting the Title VII
statute of limitations, the Congress balanced the competing concerns
of plaintiffs and defendants. If a literal application of Rule IS(c) does
give a relation-back defendant some advantage, the courts should not
hesitate to balance this windfall back toward the pro se, in forma
pauperis plaintiff by giving reliance the greater weight in the equitable
tolling analysis. 316
CONCLUSION

The interaction between Title VII, the in forma pauperis statute
and Rule IS(c) results in a complicated procedural maze for the Title
VII plaintiff attempting to sue the federal government. When the
plaintiff errs and names the wrong Title VII defendant, the strict con
struction of Rule IS(c), dictated by Schiavone v. Fortune, operates to
trap the plaintiff in this maze precluding litigation of the merits. At
the present time, the only method of escape from this trap is the use of
equitable tolling of the Title VII limitations period to allow an
312. Note, Threshold Requirement, supra note 56, at 603.
313. FED. R. CIV. P. 4(j). For the text of Rule 4(j), see supra note 100.
314. Note, Threshold Requirement, supra note 56, at 603; see also Brussack, supra
note 56, at 682-83.
315. Note, Threshold Requirement, supra note 56, at 603 (citations omitted); see also
Brussack, supra note 56, at 683, 688.
316. In the case of the plaintiff who is not proceeding in forma pauperis and is repre
sented by counsel, there are probably few equities which would warrant any application of
tolling. See Schiavone v. Fortune, 477 U.S. 21, 24-25 (1986). Hence, in the absence of any
change in Rule 15(c), Schiavone applies and the relation-back defendant continues to enjoy
rights superior to the defendant who is properly named within the limitations period. See
generally Note, Threshold Requirement, supra note 56.

268

WESTERN NEW ENGLAND

iAw REVIEW

[Vol. 13:225

amended complaint to relate back to the date of the original pleading.
Unfortunately for the in forma pauperis plaintiff, equitable tolling will
not always be allowed unless the plaintiff has met all the requirements
of a multi-step tolling analysis. An amendment to Rule lS(c), an ex
tension of the Title VII limitations period, or a policy of judicial leni
ency in the application of tolling would offer the Title VII, in forma
pauperis plaintiffs who have named the incorrect defendant an oppor
tunity to pursue the merits of their claims.
Sandra L. Cordes- Vaughan

